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Abstract 
Although global poverty reduction strategies have achieved some positive results, 1.2 
billion people still live in extreme poverty. Two principal strategies are commonly 
used to tackle poverty: the provision of public services and social protection 
programs. This dissertation explores the links between the two strategies and poverty 
reduction in Indonesia. The study starts by exploring the persistence of poverty in 
rural Indonesia. Using panel data of household and community surveys, the study 
found evidence of state dependence of poverty, that is, the likelihood of being poor is 
significantly associated with poverty status in the previous period. Therefore, 
policies aimed at lifting the poor out of poverty may not only reduce current poverty 
rates but might also boost long-term growth. The results also suggest the importance 
of public services and community infrastructures in determining household poverty 
status. Secondly, this dissertation analyzes the impact of decentralized public 
spending on education on educational outcomes. Using a panel dataset of Indonesian 
districts from 2001-2012, combining household surveys, village censuses, and 
district fiscal data, the analysis reveals that decentralized public spending on 
education by local governments has a negligible impact on education outcomes 
across income distribution, including the poor. The results suggest that improving the 
quality of public spending on education is essential for better outcomes of 
decentralized public service delivery. Thirdly, this research highlights the roles of 
social protection programs in response to rising food prices. Social protection helps 
poor households maintain their food and nutrition security, especially during crises. 
This study evaluates the synergy impacts of two main social protection programs in 
Indonesia – Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) and Subsidized Rice Program (Raskin) 
– on food and nutrition security. The analysis reveals that CCT had a much greater 
impact on food and nutrition security for existing Raskin recipients. The study also 
found that providing both CCT and Raskin may not always yield better outcomes 
than providing only CCT. The study suggests to consider the importance of 
reformulating these overlapping programs, especially because Raskin consumes 
more than half of the social protection budget.  
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Zusammenfassung 
Obwohl die globalen Armutsbekämpfungsstrategien einige positive Ergebnisse 
erzielt haben, leben 1,2 Milliarden Menschen noch immer in extremer Armut. Zwei 
Hauptstrategien werden häufig verwendet, um Armut zu bekämpfen: die 
Bereitstellung von öffentlichen Diensten und Sozialschutzprogramme. Diese 
Dissertation untersucht die Beziehung zwischen den beiden Strategien einerseits und 
der Verringerung der Armut in Indonesien andererseits. Die Studie beginnt mit der 
Untersuchung der Persistenz der Armut im ländlichen Indonesien. Durch 
Paneldatenanalyse von Haushalts- und Community-Befragungen fand die Studie 
Anzeichen für eine Statusabhängigkeit der Armut, das heißt, die Wahrscheinlichkeit, 
arm zu sein, ist signifikant assoziiert mit  dem Armutsstatus in der Vorperiode. 
Daher könnten Strategien zur Befreiung der Armen aus der Armut nicht nur aktuelle 
Armutsquoten reduzieren, sondern auch das langfristige Wachstum steigern. Des 
Weiteren legen unsere Ergebnisse  die Bedeutsamkeit von öffentlichen 
Dienstleistungen und den Infrastrukturen der Gemeinden für die Bestimmung des 
Armutsstatus nahe. Zweitens analysiert diese Dissertation die Auswirkungen 
dezentraler öffentlicher Ausgaben für Bildung auf die Bildungsergebnisse. Mit Hilfe 
eines Paneldatensatzes zur Situation der indonesische Bezirke von 2001-2012, der 
Haushaltsbefragungen, Zensusdaten auf Ebene der Dörfer und Haushaltsdaten von 
Bezirken kombinierte, zeigt die Analyse, dass die dezentralen öffentlichen 
Bildungsausgaben der lokalen Regierungen einen vernachlässigbaren Einfluss auf 
die Bildungsergebnisse in der Einkommensverteilung, einschließlich der Armen, 
haben. Die Ergebnisse legen nahe, dass die Verbesserung der Qualität der 
öffentlichen Ausgaben für Bildung essentiell ist, um durch die dezentrale Erbringung 
öffentlicher Dienstleistungen bessere Ergebnisse zu erreichen. Drittens hebt diese 
Forschung die Rolle der Sozialschutzprogramme als Reaktion auf steigende 
Lebensmittelpreise hervor. Sozialschutz hilft armen Haushalten, ihre Ernährungs- 
und Nahrungssicherheit zu erhalten, vor allem in Krisenzeiten. Diese Studie bewertet 
die Synergiewirkungen von zwei Sozialschutzprogramme in Indonesien – dem 
Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) und  dem subventionierten Reisprogramm 
(Raskin) – auf die Ernährungs- und Nahrungssicherheit. Wir fanden, dass CCT einen 
viel größeren Einfluss auf die Ernährungs- und Nahrungssicherheit für bestehende 
Raskin-Empfänger hatte. Außerdem stellten wir fest, dass die gleichzeitige 
Unterstützung durch CCT und Raskin nicht immer zu besseren Ergebnissen führt als 
die alleinige Bereitstellung von CCT. Die Studie legt nahe, diese überlappenden 
Programme neu zu formulieren vor allem, da Raskin mehr als die Hälfte des 
Sozialschutzbudgets verbraucht. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1. Background 
The United Nations (UN) Millennium Development Goals (MDG) report for 2014 
stated that global poverty has been halved five years ahead of the 2015 time frame. 
Thus, global poverty reduction strategies have had some positive results. However, 
1.2 billion people still live in extreme poverty. They are left behind because poverty 
reduction has most often benefited people living close to the poverty line rather than 
those at the very bottom of the income distribution (von Braun et al., 2009). World 
leaders have now agreed on the long-term agenda to improve people’s lives and 
protect the planet for future generations as the current MDG targets expire at the end 
of 2015. The first transformation shift in this post-2015 development agenda is to 
leave no one behind, to move the goal from reducing to ending poverty. This means 
that no single person, regardless of race, ethnicity, gender, or other status, should be 
denied universal human rights and basic economic opportunities.  
Among the 1.2 billion people who live on less than $1.25 a day, nearly 50% lives in 
sub-Saharan Africa. The second biggest concentration of the extremely poor is in 
Asia, and less than 20% lives in Latin America/Caribbean and North Africa (UN 
MDG Report, 2014). Although poverty is scattered across the globe, the related 
issues are more critical in developing countries, including Indonesia. Indonesia is 
ranked as the world’s 10th largest economy based on the 2011 International 
Comparison Program (ICP); however, poverty is still a serious problem for the 
country. Indonesia’s rapid economic growth has not been balanced with a rapid 
reduction in poverty rates.  
As in many other developing countries, tackling poverty in Indonesia requires a 
multisectoral approach. Poverty and deprivation are indeed multidimensional 
realities (Sen, 1976). Poverty can be interpreted as a lack of access to various basic 
needs, including nutrition, health, education, housing, security, and opportunity for 
future improvement (Deaton, 2006). Hence, ending poverty means dealing with 
problems in education, health, agriculture, infrastructure, water and sanitation, 
energy, and governance, as well as information and technology. In addition, 
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Indonesia has great diversity in culture, ethnicity, and geographic and ecological 
conditions that bring many challenges to ending poverty.  
Poverty reduction remains as a mainstay in the country’s development agenda. It is 
always stated as the highest priority in all the government’s key policy and planning 
documents.  Indonesia’s official poverty rate in 2013 was 11.6%. That number 
reflects a decrease from about 40% in the 1970s. Despite this success in reducing 
poverty, another quarter of the population is still vulnerable to poverty. Small 
economic shocks like a job loss, conflict, disaster, or illness can easily bring the non-
poor into poverty (Banerjee & Duflo, 2007; Collier, 2007; Carter et al., 2007, von 
Braun et al., 2004). The larger the loss from a shock, the slower the recovery 
(Dercon, 2004). Indeed, negative long-term impacts occur when households must 
reduce their expenditure for education, pulling children out of school (Behrman et 
al., 2001), or reduce their food consumption, including for their children (Hoddinott 
& Kinsey, 2001). 
To end poverty, a country needs poverty reduction strategies that are effective 
enough to reach the poor and improve their lives. This dissertation intends to shed 
light on this issue, specifically on basic public services/infrastructures and social 
protection programs – two main government policies in alleviating poverty – to 
understand their effectiveness in improving outcomes for the poor. 
 
1.2. Objectives of the Study 
This dissertation consists of three empirical chapters integrated by the elements of 
poverty. As mentioned in the previous section, there are two principal strategies that 
are commonly used to tackle poverty: provision of basic services/infrastructures and 
social protection programs. This study particularly examines the links between 
public services, social protection, and poverty reduction in Indonesia. The conceptual 
framework is shown as follows: 
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Figure 1.1 Conceptual Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own illustration based on Bourguignon (2004) 
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through human capital accumulation (e.g., conditional cash transfer (CCT) program) 
and some intend directly to lift up the beneficiaries from poverty (e.g., rice subsidy 
program).  
The specific research objectives of the dissertation are outlined as follows: 
- to investigate the persistence of poverty in Indonesia with a particular focus 
on the state dependence approach and the role of public services and 
community infrastructures 
- to examine how changes in educational outcomes relate with changes in local 
government expenditures on education under decentralization era 
- to evaluate the impact of two main social protection programs: CCT and 
Subsidized Rice for the Poor (Raskin), as well as their synergy impact, on 
food and nutrition security indicators 
1.3 Structure of the Dissertation 
1.3.1. Poverty Persistence in Rural Indonesia 
This dissertation starts by analyzing the persistence of poverty in rural Indonesia. 
Although poverty has been falling over the past few decades, 15 million Indonesian 
households frequently fall in and out of poverty (World Bank, 2012a). In addition, 
the gap in the access to infrastructure, health, and educational facilities has persisted 
in recent years, especially in the rural areas. The first analytical chapter investigates 
the dynamics of poverty prevalence in rural Indonesia focusing on the state 
dependence approach, as well as the roles of geographic/community endowments in 
the form of publicly provided goods, such as community infrastructure and public 
services. State dependence in poverty means the current poverty is driven by the 
previous status of poverty. This implies the policies to reduce risks of poverty and 
mitigate its consequences are important for both short-term poverty reduction and 
long-term growth. There are some previous studies on poverty persistence in 
Indonesia, however they do not focus on the state dependence approach or the roles 
of community infrastructures and public services (Bidani and Ravallion, 1993; 
Suryahadi et. al, 2009; Alisjahbana and Yusuf, 2003; Dewi and Suryahadi, 2014). 
The first analytical chapter of this dissertation attempts to fill this gap by 
investigating whether the state dependence of poverty is applicable for the case of 
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Indonesia. Furthermore, the combination of household and community panel data is 
used to explore the roles of public services and community infrastructures in 
determining household’s poverty status. This study uses the Indonesia Life Family 
Survey (IFLS), a longitudinal socioeconomic and health survey of individuals, 
households, communities, and facilities. The survey has been conducted in 1993, 
1997, 2000, and 2007. The state dependence of poverty and other relevant covariates 
of poverty are analyzed using dynamic probit random effect model and Wooldridge 
Conditional Maximum Likelihood estimator. 
 
1.3.2. Decentralization, Public Spending, and Education 
The provision of public services is often associated with governance and institutional 
arrangements. Decentralization, one of the most common governance reforms, has 
been observed to have potential in improving efficiency in public service delivery 
(Oates, 1972; Ahmad and Brosio, 2009; Birner and von Braun, 2015). Indonesia 
implemented such a reform in 2001. The responsibilities for planning, financing, and 
providing public services were transferred from the central government to the local 
governments at the district level, with expectations that local needs and preferences 
will be better represented. The evidence for whether decentralization plays any role 
in improving public service delivery, especially the public services that matter the 
most for the poor, is currently inconclusive (Reinikka and Svensson, 2001; Barankay 
and Lockwood, 2006). The second empirical chapter of this dissertation attempts to 
fill this gap by analyzing the effectiveness of decentralized public spending allocated 
by the local governments at the district level in improving educational outcomes e.g. 
high school net enrolment rates, transition rates to high school, and number of junior 
high school per 1000 junior-secondary-aged-children. This study combines 
household survey, village census, and local government fiscal data from 2001 – 2012 
and performs the analysis using standard OLS (Ordinary Least Square), fixed-effect, 
and instrumental variable method. 
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1.3.3. Social Protection and Food and Nutrition Security 
The last empirical chapter examines synergies between two main Indonesian social 
protection programs: CCT and Raskin on food and nutrition security indicators. 
Many developing countries have implemented a range of social protection programs 
as part of their broader poverty reduction strategies to help poor and vulnerable 
households confront the risk to their livelihood and maintain adequate access to food 
and other basic needs. Although the capacities to design and implement social 
protection policies have become more widespread over the past two decades (von 
Braun et al., 2009), their impacts in improving real outcomes are still in question. 
Many researchers have studied the impact of social protection programs (Ahmed et 
al., 2002; Schultz, 2004); however, to the best of my knowledge, none has examined 
the joint effect/synergy between programs. The third analytical chapter of this 
dissertation aims to fill this gap by investigating the synergy impact of CCT and 
Raskin on food and nutrition security outcomes. Using panel data from baseline and 
follow-up household surveys, this chapter performs multiple treatment analysis 
combining Inverse Probability Weighting and Difference-in-Difference method. The 
outcomes selected are indicators covering a dimension of food and nutrition security 
that can be assessed at household level: food utilization (measured by Diet Diversity 
Score (DDS)).  
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Chapter 2. Poverty Persistence in Rural Indonesia: What are the 
Roles of Public Services and Community Infrastructures? 
	
2.1. Introduction 
Poverty in Indonesia has been falling over the past few decades. Despite this, about 
15 million Indonesian households are still vulnerable and frequently fall in and out of 
poverty (World Bank, 2012a). The gap between the rich and the poor has also been 
deepening since 2000. Not only is Indonesia facing increasing inequality in 
household income/consumption, it is also experiencing serious inequality problems 
in terms of access to public services. The gap in the access to infrastructure, health, 
and educational facilities has persisted in recent years, especially in the rural areas. 
Consequently, this paper contributes to the literature by investigating the dynamics 
of poverty prevalence in rural Indonesia. Focus is placed on the state dependence 
approach, as well as the roles of geographic capital in the form of publicly provided 
goods, such as community infrastructure and public services. 
Poverty is a complex problem. To end extreme poverty and reduce inequality, 
collective actions are needed from different actors in many sectors (e.g., health, 
education, and infrastructure). Health and/or educational facilities would not be able 
to provide their services to the needy if they are not accessible, due to being a large 
distance away or having a lack of accessible roads to reach them. Health and/or 
educational facilities similarly would not be able to function properly if they do not 
have sufficient electricity or running water to support their main services. Therefore, 
integrated actions from the many sectors are important to reduce poverty and 
inequality.  
Furthermore, there is a difficulty in reaching the poor, who usually sit at the margins 
of systems.  This can be explained by a set of distances (e.g., being located in remote 
or harsh environments) and social distances (e.g., being excluded, discriminated 
against, or not having rights or access to services or opportunities). It may also be 
related to technological and institutional infrastructure deficiencies (von Braun & 
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Gatzweiler, 2014). Thus, the integration of poverty concepts with those of social 
exclusion, geography, and ecology is needed to address this problem.  
There is extensive evidence on the persistence of poverty in the geographic areas of 
Brazil, China and Bangladesh (Ferreira & Lanjouw, 2001; Park et al., 2002; 
Khandker et al., 2010).  A poverty persistence experience does not exclude areas 
located in countries with high economic growth (e.g., China, India, Indonesia, 
Nigeria, Peru, and Mexico). Jalan and Ravallion (2002) present several aspects that 
contribute to this phenomenon. One aspect is because of the role of persistent spatial 
concentrations of individuals with personal attributes which constrain their welfare 
improvement. This would cause identical individuals that have the same opportunity 
to grow wherever they live. This model is also known as the individualistic model 
(Ravallion, 1998). Another aspect is because geography plays a causal role in 
determining household’s welfare. This means that living in a well-endowed area 
means that a poor household can eventually escape from poverty (known as 
geographic model).  
In the individualistic model, it is important to distinguish different possibilities that 
may influence poverty prevalence. The first possibility is that individuals are poor 
because of their characteristics that make them particularly prone to poverty. These 
characteristics may be observed (e.g., educational attainment, health conditions, 
household welfare) or unobserved (e.g., lack of motivation, ability, unfavorable 
behaviors). These characteristics may persist over time and increase the probability 
of being poor in the future. Another possibility is that poverty conditions in one 
period have a causal effect on future poverty, due to the depreciation of human and 
physical capital stocks. This mechanism is usually called the true state dependence 
effect. There are several examples of state dependence effects: a poverty experience 
that is connected to demoralization, a loss of motivation or a depreciation of human 
capital.  These effects could increase the risk of future poverty. Another example is if 
the poverty experience is associated with having many connections with ‘bad’ 
contacts, which may lead to drug/alcohol problems or have detrimental effects on the 
quality of job opportunities available (Biewen, 2009). These different possibilities 
imply different policy recommendations. If the persistence of poverty is due to a 
state dependence effect, then it makes sense to focus on efforts to help households 
out of poverty in order to reduce their probability of being poor again in the future. 
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In the case of an insignificant effect of state dependence, which means the 
persistence of poverty is only due to the household’s unobserved characteristics, any 
policy aimed at helping households out of poverty (e.g., cash/in-kind transfer) does 
not reduce their chance of experiencing poverty in the subsequent periods. Hence, in 
this paper, we analyze the poverty dynamics by examining the true state dependence 
effect, while allowing for the presence of a household’s unobserved characteristics. 
In the geographic model, geography has a causal role in determining a household’s 
welfare. Hence, it is important for policy makers to better understand the role of 
geographic factors in growth prospects and poverty prevalence (Engerman and 
Sokoloff, 1998). Indonesia’s geographic diversity, including the unequal spatial 
distribution of geographic and community endowments that comes from publicly 
provided goods (e.g., public services and community infrastructure), makes an 
appropriate case to analyze the existence of geographic poverty traps. Therefore, this 
paper focuses on the roles of geographic capital in the form of public infrastructure 
and services in a community on poverty prevalence, especially in rural areas, where 
the infrastructure and public services are still lacking.  
The next section presents the literature review related to the state dependence of 
poverty and specific studies about poverty in Indonesia. Section 2.3 describes the 
data used in the analysis and the descriptive statistics of the main variables. Section 
2.4 discusses the methods used to capture poverty persistence. Section 2.5 presents 
the estimation results and the last section concludes the chapter. 
 
2.2. Literature Review 
Poverty dynamics have commonly been analyzed in three ways: 1) income or 
consumption models with a lag structure of the error terms (e.g., Lillard & Willis, 
1978), 2) probabilities of ending poverty (Bane & Ellwood, 1986; Stevens, 1994), 
and 3) approaches to separate chronic and transient poverty (Hulme & Shepherd, 
2003; Jalan & Ravallion, 2000). Many studies exist on poverty dynamics in 
developing countries, such as South Africa (Aliber, 2003), Uganda (Deiniger & 
Okidi, 2003), Cote d’Ivoire (Grootaert & Kanbur, 1995), Egypt (Haddad & Ahmed, 
2003), India (Krisna, 2004), Ethiopia (Dercon and Krishnan, 2000), Argentina 
23	
	
(Cruces and Wodon, 2003), Bangladesh (Sen, 2003), Kenya and Madagascar (Barret 
et al.,  2006). Most of these studies focus on the mobility in the poverty status. They 
attempt to distinguish chronic from transient poverty and did not take into account 
the issue of unobserved heterogeneity and the state dependence effect.  
Few papers have analyzed the issue of unobserved heterogeneity, the state 
dependence effect in poverty or the issues of the endogeneity of the initial conditions 
(Stevens, 1999; Cappellari and Jenkins, 2002). Alem (2015) applies a dynamic probit 
model to analyze the persistence of poverty.  The results revealed that there is a 
statistically strong state dependence in poverty in urban Ethiopia. Alem also analyzes 
the occupational and demographic characteristics of all household members that 
were found to have important roles in determining poverty. Bigsten and Shimeles 
(2008) explore the persistence of poverty in both urban and rural Ethiopia. They did 
not control for the initial conditions problem, as in Alem (2015).  They found a 
slightly higher coefficient for the state dependence variable.  
More studies have been conducted on the state dependence in poverty in developed 
countries, as opposed to developing countries. Arranz and Canto (2010) examine 
poverty exit and re-entry rates in Spain and found that the rates varied according to 
personal or household characteristics, spell accumulations and the duration of past 
spells. Their results indicate the importance of duration dependence. Giraldo et al. 
(2002) presents no evidence of a significant effect of the true state dependence in 
poverty using panel data from an Italian household income and wealth survey. Their 
analysis reveals that the length of a panel does not make any significant difference 
for the degree of dependence between the states during the different time periods.   
A few studies about poverty in Indonesia exist. However, most of these studies focus 
on static poverty (Bidani and Ravallion, 1993; Suryahadi et al., 2009). The dynamics 
of poverty have not been widely explored in Indonesia. Suryahadi and Sumarto 
(2001) use cross-sectional data to estimate poverty and vulnerability in Indonesia 
before and after the 1997-1998 crisis. They found that the level of poverty and 
vulnerability increased after the crisis. Much of the increase was due to an increase 
in chronic poverty. Alisjahbana and Yusuf (2003) use panel data (1993 and 1997) to 
explore the factors that explain chronic and transient poverty. They found that the 
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education of a household head, the assets, and the household demographics 
significantly contributes to the prevalence of chronic and transient poverty.  
Dartanto and Nurkholis (2011) examine the determinants of poverty dynamics using 
panel data for the years of 2005-2007.  They find that 28% of poor households were 
classified as poor (remained poor in the two time periods), while 7% of non-poor 
households are vulnerable to being transient poor. Dewi and Suryahadi (2014) study 
poverty dynamics in Indonesia and assess its impact on the efficiency of the poverty 
program’s targeting. They use panel data from Susenas (National Socio Economic 
Survey) for the years of 2008-2010. They found that there is a high level household 
poverty dynamics in Indonesia. This leads to the inefficient targeting of poverty 
programs, particularly in terms of the inability of the poor to access poverty 
programs. These previous studies do not focus on the measure of the state 
dependence in poverty or the effects of the geographic/community’s endowments.  
This paper attempts to fill the gap by analyzing the dynamics of poverty prevalence 
in Indonesia by focusing on a state dependence approach. We also investigate the 
role of geographic/community endowments in explaining the prevalence of poverty 
that has been scarcely explored.  
 
2.3. Data & Descriptive Statistics 
2.3.1. Provincial differences in poverty prevalence, access to health, education, 
and infrastructure facilities  
To provide an overview of the inequality in geographic capital and endowments 
across Indonesia, we analyze the provincial differences in poverty prevalence and 
access to infrastructure, health, and education facilities.  
Figure 2.1 illustrates the large range of poverty rates in the Indonesian provinces. 
The poverty rates in the eastern islands of Indonesia are about eight times that of the 
rates in Jakarta/Bali. Several provinces have poverty rates that are three times that of 
the rates in the other provinces in the same regions. For example, the Bangka 
Belitung islands has a poverty rate of 5.37%, while Bengkulu has a poverty rate of 
17.5%.   
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Figure 2.1 Indonesian map and poverty map of Indonesia  
 
 
Source: Own calculation based on Susenas (2012) 
 
To see the gaps in access to health, education and infrastructure facilities across the 
provinces, we also use a village census that contains information about the 
availability of infrastructure, health, and educational facilities in a village. The 
census was conducted three times every ten years, from 1983 to 2011. We use data 
from 1990 and 2008 to capture the time period used in the regression analysis. The 
village census recorded information from 67,515 villages in 1990 and 75,410 
villages in 2008. 
Figure 2.2 presents a provincial map with the share of villages that had access to 
paved roads in each province. In 1990, 10% of the villages in Central Kalimantan 
and West Kalimantan had paved main roads. The share of paved roads in most 
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provinces in Java was 50 percent or more. The discrepancies are very apparent in 
both years, although there have been some noticeable improvements between 1990 
and 2008. More provinces have a higher share of villages with access to paved roads 
in 2008. Improvements are concentrated in Java and Sumatera Island. Nevertheless, 
the gap remains large. In 2008, the lowest share was Papua, with only 13% of 
villages having access to a paved road. In the other part of the country, more than 
three quarters of the villages in Java had access to paved roads.  
Figure 2.2 Shares of villages with access to paved roads  
1990 
2008 
 
 
In 1990, three provinces in Kalimantan (west, central, and east) had the lowest 
average (less than 10%) of household shares with electricity in a village (Figure 2.3). 
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improvements in the access to electricity in the past few decades. In 2008, some 
provinces in Sulawesi and Kalimantan and almost all provinces in Java, Bali, 
Sumatera have the average household shares with access to electricity about 90 
percent or higher. While in the other part Indonesia, only less than half of population 
in each village in West Sulawesi, Riau, East Nusa Tenggara, and Papua had access to 
electricity.  
Figure 2.3 Average household shares with access to electricity 
1990 
 
2008 
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Figure 2.4 shows that the discrepancies in the number of junior high schools per 
1000 students across the provinces in 1990 was not large. The lowest number was 
1.5 in West Java and the highest was 3.6 in Central Sulawesi. In 2008, most of the 
provinces in Java had a low number of less than 3 junior high schools per 1000 
(junior-high-school-aged students). Maluku, North and West Sulawesi, and East 
Kalimantan had a higher number of junior high schools per 1000 students (more than 
5 schools per 1000 students). The low number of junior high schools in Java in 
recent years is not surprising, considering the large numbers of people migrating to 
the Java islands and the urbanization in the past few decades. 
Figure 2.4 Number of junior high schools per 1000 students  
1990 
2008 
 
The average number of health staff per 1000 people in each province, in general, was 
very low, considering it includes physicians, nurses, and other paramedics. In 1990, 
the average was 0.4 to 1.6 health staff per 1000 people. Lampung and West Java had 
Junior high school > 5
Junior High School: 4-5
Junior High School: 3-4
Junior High School: 2-3
Share < 2
no data
Junior high school > 5
Junior High School: 4-5
Junior High School: 3-4
Junior High School: 2-3
Share < 2
no data
29	
	
the lowest number of health staff per 1000 people with 0.4. North Sulawesi had the 
highest number with 1.6. In 2008, some provinces had a higher number of health 
staff (e.g., Aceh, Maluku, North Sulawesi, Papua), while some provinces, especially 
in Java, experienced deteriorating numbers of health staff (Figure 2.5). This is again 
due the increased population in Java in the past few decades. 
Figure 2.5 Number of health staff per 1000 people  
1990 
2008 
 
 
Provincial differences in access to infrastructure, health, and educational facilities, in 
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2.3.2. Data for the Regression Analysis 
The dataset for the regression analysis in this paper was obtained from the Indonesia 
Life Family Survey (IFLS). The IFLS is a longitudinal socioeconomic and health 
survey of individuals, households, communities, and facilities. The survey was 
conducted in 1993, 1997, 2000, and 2007. The IFLS collects data on individuals, 
households, the communities in which they live, and the community’s endowments, 
such as economic development and the infrastructure facilities they use or have 
access to. The IFLS is particularly suitable to examine a household’s persistence and 
the dynamics of poverty.  It is also good for exploring possible community, 
household, and individual characteristics contributing to the observed poverty status, 
since it recorded both the household panel data and the geographic/community data 
needed for this particular analysis.  
The IFLS is a longitudinal dataset with very low attrition rates. 94% of households 
that were interviewed in the first wave in 1993 (7,224 households) were re-
interviewed in the second wave in 1997. The re-contact rates remained high for the 
third and fourth waves, with 95% and 92% rates, respectively. The IFLS samples 
represent 83% of the Indonesian population in 1993. 13 out of 27 provinces were 
included in the sample. The provinces were selected to maximize the representation 
of the Indonesian population and capture the heterogeneity in the cultural and 
socioeconomic conditions. Some far eastern provinces (East Nusa Tenggara, East 
Timor, Maluku, and Irian Jaya) were excluded for cost-effectiveness reasons.  
The IFLS randomly selected 321 enumeration areas in the 13 provinces using a 1993 
Susenas (National Socio-economic Survey) sampling frame. The Susenas frame was 
designed by the BPS (Central Bureau of Statistics) and was based on the National 
Census in 1990. Using this frame, the Javanese who account for more than 50% of 
the total population proportionally dominated the IFLS sample.  
To measure poverty, we use monthly consumption expenditures and national poverty 
lines, defined by the BPS as a reference line.1 The definition of consumption used in 
the dataset incorporates both food and non-food components. Data on food 
																																																													
1 	An individual is considered poor if his/her monthly per capita expenditures are below the national poverty line. The 
Indonesian poverty line is determined by the BPS (Badan Pusat Statistik, Statistics Indonesia) and is based on the average of 
what the poor spend on different kinds of food to reach 2,100 calories per day and non-food items to cover the costs of housing, 
clothing, education and health care. The poverty line takes into account the variation of prices across the regions.	
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expenditures were recorded for 38 food items purchased during the week prior to the 
interview. Data on non-food expenditures were recorded during the month prior to 
the interview and covered household goods (e.g., electricity, water, education, health, 
communications & transportation). Table 2.1 illustrates the descriptive statistics of 
the main variables used in the regression analysis. 
Table 2.1 Summary statistics 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Household characteristics:   
Own a farm business (binary) 10654 0.56 0.50 0 1
Own a non-farm business (binary) 10658 0.29 0.45 0 1
Number of farm business assets 10658 1.68 2.29 0 10
Number of non-farm business assets 10658 0.23 0.58 0 5
Age of household head 10656 49.25 13.60 15 105
Education of household head: Primary  
school completed 10658 0.20 0.40 0 1
Education of household head: High 
school (or higher) completed 10658 0.03 0.16 0 1
Village/Community characteristics:   
Availability of paved main road 
(binary) 10658 0.63 0.48 0 1
Availability of piped water (binary) 10658 0.78 0.41 0 1
Number of health care services 
provided in the community health 
center 10635 28.39 10.86 6 70
Distance to nearest terminal 10633 6.88 9.69 0 110
Distance to the provincial office 10446 145.98 111.01 0.45 900
Availability of high school (binary) 10658 0.81 0.39 0 1
Ever experienced disruptions in pipe 
water service in the past year 
(binary) 10658 0.11 0.31 0 1
Share of population in a village with 
access to electricity 10617 66.59 32.20 0 100
Availability of technical (non-
primitive) irrigation system in the 
village 9694 0.37 0.48 0 1
Measure of ethnic diversity (ELF) 10658 0.07 0.14 0 0.70
Resides in Sumatera 10658 0.20 0.40 0 1
Resides in Java 10658 0.62 0.48 0 1
Resides in Kalimantan 10658 0.05 0.21 0 1
Resides in Sulawesi 10658 0.05 0.22 0 1
Resides in Nusa Tenggara 10658 0.08 0.27 0 1
Source: Own calculations using IFLS data. 
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We utilize household and household head characteristics (e.g., age, education). We 
also utilize whether the household owns a farm business (e.g., owns land for farming 
and has a title of ownership), non-farm business, farm business assets (e.g., hard 
stem plants, such as coconut, coffee, cloves, rubber), house/building used for a farm 
business, vehicles (e.g., motor bikes, cars, trucks, water vehicles, tractors), heavy 
equipment (e.g., farming machinery, generators), and non-farm business assets (e.g., 
land, buildings, four-wheel vehicles, other vehicles, other non-farm equipment). The 
descriptive statistics show that more than half of the surveyed households own a 
farm business. Agriculture sector still dominates in rural areas. Only 3% of 
household head attained high school or higher. Numbers of farm business and non-
farm business assets vary with the average 1.68 and 0.23 respectively.  
Furthermore, we analyze public services and community infrastructure variables:  
predominant type of road in the village (e.g., paved or non-paved), water source 
(e.g., pipe water) in the village, number of services provided by the community 
health center in the village (e.g., outpatient, inpatient, dental, prenatal, childbirth, 
health check-up), the availability of a high school in the village, disruptions in pipe 
water services in the past year, the share of the village population with access to 
electricity, and the availability of a technical (non-primitive) irrigation system. The 
distance from the office of the head of the village to the nearest terminal and 
provincial capital center, as well as a control for ethnic diversity, are also included.2 
63% of the surveyed households reside in a village with paved main road. Only 37% 
of the surveyed households reside in a village with technical/non-primitive irrigation 
system. Number of health care services provided in the community health center 
varies from 6 to 70 with the average 28. Share of population in a village with access 
to electricity also varies from 32 to 100 with the average 66 %. 
																																																													
2 We use ELF (ethno linguistic fractionalization) as a Herfindahl index to control for the ethnic 
diversity measure. ELF measures the fragmentation of the probability that two randomly drawn 
individuals from the unit of observation belong to two different groups/ethnics (Easterly and Levine, 
1997). 
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2.4. Estimation Strategy 
2.4.1. State dependence and covariates of poverty 
The current state of poverty is modeled as a function of poverty in the previous 
period using a dynamic probit model with an unobserved effect: 
݌௜௖௧ ൌ ߙ݌௜௖௧ିଵ ൅ ߚݔ௜௖௧ ൅ ߜݖ௖௧ ൅ ߛ௜௖ ൅ ߝ௜௖௧																																									ሺ1ሻ 
where 	݌௜௖௧ is the poverty status of household i , who lives in community c at time t. 
݌௜௖௧ is equal to one if the household is poor or if the household’s consumption is less 
than the poverty line. ݌௜௖௧ is equal to zero if the household is not poor. ݔ௜௧ is a vector 
of the household’s explanatory variables. ݖ௖௧ is the community/village characteristics 
and ߝ௜௖௧  is the error term. ߙ  is the parameter that is included with the aim of 
representing	 the true state dependence; it indicates that the current poverty status 
causes the future likelihood of being poor or a higher risk to continue living in 
poverty. ߛ௜௖  denotes the household’s time invariant unobserved characteristics that 
may influence the likelihood of poverty. These characteristics could include the 
motivation, ability, or behavior of the households that are unobserved and the time 
invariant that influences their poverty status. 
One important concern in our model is the potential endogeneity due to households 
choosing their community or place of residence. In the case of Indonesia, as in many 
other developing countries, mobility is not without any costs. Even though migration 
is administratively possible, it has both huge direct and opportunity costs. The direct 
cost is borne by Indonesia’s geographic barriers that imply high transportation costs 
and the limited mobility of the households. The opportunity costs relate to the 
previous sources of income, as well as the economic returns to the business assets 
left in the place of origin.  
Furthermore, even though Indonesia is recognized as one of the world’s major 
sources of unskilled migrant workers to the Southeast countries (Hugo, 2005; 
Sukamdi and Brownlee, 1998), internal migration in Indonesia is dominated by the 
rural to urban migration, where the largest cities (e.g., Jakarta, Surabaya, Bandung, 
or province’s capital city) are the main destinations (Muhidin, 2002; Lu, 2008). In 
addition, the migration status is usually defined at the individual level, not at the 
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household level. Therefore, it is not common to see all household members move 
from one rural area to another. 
Another concern that may rise in our specification is the ethnic diversity variable, 
which has been known in the literature to have an effect on economic growth 
(Easterly and Levine, 1997; Alesina et al., 2003; Goeren, 2014) and the provision of 
public goods (Miguel and Gugerty, 2005; Habyarimana et al., 2007). Our 
preliminary investigations do not find a significant negative association between 
ethnic diversity and the public services/community infrastructure variables used in 
the analysis. We include the Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization/ELF variable as a 
measure of ethnic diversity to control for this. Moreover, the method used in the 
analysis has captured the time-invariant unobserved household heterogeneity that 
may influence the household’s behavior, due to the effect of ethnic diversity. 
Apart from the concern of endogeneity and the time invariant unobserved 
household’s characteristics, the main problem in the dynamic poverty model, as in 
Equation (1), is that the household’s poverty status in the initial period may be 
influenced by an earlier poverty history. In addition, the poverty status in the initial 
period may be correlated with the unobserved characteristics that contribute to 
poverty. The unobserved factors could be related to the motivation, abilities, parental 
effect, community and social network that can influence the poverty status at t = 0.  
A random effect probit model assumes the initial condition to be exogenous. 
Therefore, it will result in inconsistent estimates in our model. There are several 
alternative methods available to tackle this problem. They include the Heckman 
(1981) and Woolridge (2005) methods. This study applies the latter method; this 
method will be explained in the following sub-section. 
 
2.4.2. Woolridge’s conditional maximum likelihood estimator 
To take care of the initial condition problem in the dynamic non-linear panel data 
model, Woolridge (2005) proposed a model of the distribution of the unobserved 
conditional effect on the initial value and any exogenous explanatory variables.  
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Assume that: 
ߛ௜௖|݌௜ଵ, ࢞௜, ࢠ௖ ൎ ܰሺ߲଴ ൅ ߲ଵ݌௜ଵ ൅ ߲ଶ࢞௜ ൅ ߲ଷࢠ௖ , ߪ௨ଶ                                                  (2) 
Therefore, if we write: 
ߛ௜௖ ൌ ߲଴ ൅ ߲ଵ݌௜ଵ ൅ ߲ଶ࢞௜ ൅ ߲ଷࢠ௖ ൅ ݑ௜                                                                  (3) 
where ݑ௜|ሺ݌௜௖ଵ , 	࢞௜ , ࢠ௖ ሻ~Normal(0, 	ߪ௨ଶ ) then ݌௜௖௧  given (݌௜௖௧ିଵ, … , ݌௜௖ଵ	, ࢞௜, ࢠ௖, ߛ௜௖ ) 
follows the probit model with a response probability: 
Φሺߚݔ௜௖௧ ൅ ߙ݌௜௖௧ିଵ ൅ ߜݖ௖௧ ൅ ߲଴ ൅ ߲ଵ݌௜ଵ ൅ ߲ଶ࢞௜ ൅ ߲ଷࢠ௖ ൅ ݑ௜ ൅ ߝ௜௖௧ሻ       (4) 
By plugging ߛ௜௖ of Equation (3) into Equation (1), we get: 
݌௜௖௧ ൌ ߙ݌௜௖௧ିଵ ൅ ߚݔ௜௧௖ ൅ ߜݖ௖௧ ൅ ߲଴ ൅ ߲ଵ݌௜ଵ ൅ ߲ଶ࢞௜ ൅ ߲ଷࢠ௖ ൅ ݑ௜ ൅ ߝ௜௖௧     (5) 
With this, ߛ௜௖ can be integrated out from the equation and the correlation between ݌௜ଵ 
and  ߛ௜௖ is alleviated. This results is a new unobservable term ݑ௜ that is uncorrelated 
with the initial value of the dependent variable ݌௜ଵ. 
The density of (݌௜௖ଵ, … , ݌௜௖்ሻ given (݌௜௖ଵ ൌ ݌ଵ , ࢞௜ ൌ ࢞, 	ࢠ௖ ൌ ࢠ, ݑ௜ ൌ ݑ		) is: 
∏ ሼΦ൫ߙ݌௖௧ିଵ ൅ ߚݔ௧௖ ൅ ߜݖ௖௧ ൅ ߲଴ ൅ ߲ଵ݌ଵ ൅ ߲ଶ࢞ ൅ ߲ଷࢠ௖ ൅ ݑ ൯
௣೟
ൈ ൣ1 െ Φ൫ߙ݌௖௧ିଵ ൅ ߚݔ௧௖ ൅ ߜݖ௖௧ ൅ ߲଴ ൅ ߲ଵ݌ଵ ൅ ߲ଶ࢞ ൅ ߲ଷࢠ௖ ൅ ݑ ൯൧ଵି௣೟௧்ୀଵ
     (6) 
Integrating Equation (6) against the Normal (0,	ߪ௨ଶ) density yields a density with the 
same structure as the standard random effects probit model with an explanatory 
variable at time t that now includes  (࢞௧௖௧, ݌௜௖௧ିଵ, ݌௜ଵ, ࢠ௖௧, ࢚࢞,	ࢠ௖ ). 
	
2.5. Discussion of the Results 
In this section, we discuss the estimation results for the model specified in the 
previous section. We start by employing the standard probit model without the 
lagged poverty to see the relationship between the likelihood of poverty and our 
covariates (Table 2.2, Column 1). The household and household head characteristics 
(e.g., owning a farm/non-farm business, having more assets, and being a household 
36	
	
head that is educated) are shown to have negative association with the likelihood of 
poverty. 
Residing in a village that has access to pipe water, a non-primitive irrigation system, 
and a higher share of the population with access to electricity is associated with a 
lower probability of being poor. Disruptions of pipe water services and being a larger 
distance away from a provincial office are associated with a higher probability of 
being poor. Residing in Sumatera, Java, Bali, and Kalimantan means that a 
household is less likely to experience poverty than a household in Nusa Tenggara. 
This result is in line with the current Indonesian poverty map, where Nusa Tenggara 
has higher poverty rates than the other regions in Western Indonesia.  
To see the relationship between the previous and current status of poverty, Table 2.2 
column (2) presents the results where the lagged poverty is included in the 
regressors. A significant coefficient of a lagged poverty variable suggests that a 
previous experience of being in poverty has a statistically significant relationship 
with the current status of poverty. Other covariates generally illustrate consistent 
findings with the results in Column (1), but with a slightly different level of 
magnitudes. 
Columns 3 and 4 present the estimation results using a standard random effect probit 
and a Wooldridge conditional maximum likelihood, respectively. Compared to the 
random effect estimator, the coefficient of the lagged poverty for the Wooldridge 
estimator declined from 0.83 to 0.71, but was still statistically significant at the 1% 
level. 
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Table 2.2 Determinants of poverty – Pooled probit, random effect, and 
Wooldridge estimator 
Pooled Probit 
Random 
Effect Wooldridge 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Poverty status in t = 1 (1993) 0.459*** 
(0.09) 
Lagged poverty 0.833*** 0.832*** 0.717*** 
(0.05) (0.07) (0.07) 
Own a farm business -0.066* -0.110** -0.114** -0.218*** 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) 
Own a non-farm business -0.128*** -0.103** -0.106** -0.077 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) 
Number of farm business assets -0.054*** -0.034** -0.033** -0.024 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Number of non-farm business assets -0.196*** -0.188*** -0.184*** -0.315*** 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.09) 
Age of household head -0.007 -0.023** -0.022** -0.018 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age of household head squared 0 0.000** 0.000** 0 
(0) (0) (0) (0) 
Education of household head: Primary 
school completed 
0.093** 0.06 0.056 0.012 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) 
Education of household head: High 
school (or higher) completed 
-0.638*** -0.404** -0.402** -0.311 
(0.15) (0.17) (0.17) (0.25) 
Measure of ethnic diversity (ELF) -0.879*** -0.466*** -0.461*** -0.366 
(0.15) (0.17) (0.18) (0.24) 
Availability of paved main road -0.012 0.033 0.035 0.078 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) 
Availability of piped water -0.085* -0.111* -0.110* -0.097 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) 
Number of health care services provided 
in the community health center 
0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 
(0) (0) (0) (0) 
Distance to the provincial office 0.001*** 0.000** 0.000* 0.001** 
(0) (0) (0) (0) 
Availability of a high school -0.023 0.037 0.037 0.288 
(0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.2) 
    Continued 
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Continued    
Pooled Probit 
Random 
Effect Wooldridge 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ever experienced disruptions in pipe 
water service in the past year 
0.176*** 0.232*** 0.226*** 0.157* 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) 
Share of population in a village with 
access to electricity 
-0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 0 
(0) (0) (0) (0) 
Availability of a technical (non-
primitive) irrigation system in the village 
-0.223*** -0.134*** -0.137*** -0.187*** 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) 
 
Resides in Sumatera -0.194*** -0.185** -0.201** -0.196* 
(0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.11) 
 
Resides in Java/Bali -0.193*** -0.144* -0.167** -0.235** 
(0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.11) 
Resides in Kalimantan -0.316*** -0.347*** -0.368*** -0.446*** 
(0.1) (0.12) (0.12) (0.17) 
Resides in Sulawesi -0.078 -0.028 -0.051 -0.667*** 
(0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.19) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept -0.543** -0.645** -0.652** -1.398*** 
(0.25) (0.31) (0.3) (0.45) 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients for the year 
dummy are not reported in the table. 
 
The Wooldridge estimation results yield a lower coefficient (and marginal effect) for 
the lagged dependent variable than the dynamic random effect probit model (Table 
2.3). The marginal effect of the state dependence parameter declines from 0.16 to 
0.11. This means that after controlling for the initial conditions problem, a household 
who has been poor has an 11% higher probability of being poor in the next period. 
The marginal effect of the initial state of poverty (in 1993) is 0.07 and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Compared to the residents in Nusa Tenggara, residents in 
other provinces included in the analysis framework (e.g., Sumatera, Java/Bali, 
Kalimantan, and Sulawesi) are less likely to be in poverty.  
 
Other significant covariates of poverty include owning a farm business, number of 
non-farm-business assets, disruptions of piped water services in a village, and the 
availability of a technical irrigation system. Our results reveal the importance of 
access to technical (non-primitive) irrigation systems for rural households who are 
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mostly working in the agricultural sectors. Residing in a village which has a proper 
technical irrigation system decreases the probability of being poor by about 2-3%. 
 
Table 2.3 Coefficients and marginal effects – Random effect and Wooldridge 
estimator 
 Random Effect Wooldridge 
 
Coefficient 
Marginal 
Effect Coefficient 
Marginal 
Effect 
Poverty status in t = 1 (1993) 0.459*** 0.071*** 
(0.09) (0.01) 
Lagged poverty 0.832*** 0.165*** 0.717*** 0.111*** 
 (0.07) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) 
Own a farm business -0.114** -0.022** -0.218*** -0.034*** 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) 
Own a non-farm business -0.106** -0.021** -0.077 -0.012 
 (0.05) (0.01) (0.07) (0.01) 
Number of farm business assets -0.033** -0.007** -0.024 -0.004 
 (0.01) (0) (0.02) (0) 
Number of non-farm business assets -0.184*** -0.036*** -0.315*** -0.049*** 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.09) (0.01) 
Age of household head -0.022** -0.004** -0.018 -0.003 
 (0.01) (0) (0.01) (0) 
Age of household head squared 0.000** 0.000** 0 0 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Education of household head: Primary 
school completed 
0.056 0.011 0.012 0.002 
(0.06) (0.01) (0.08) (0.01) 
Education of household head: High school 
(or higher) completed 
-0.402** -0.080** -0.311 -0.048 
(0.17) (0.03) (0.25) (0.04) 
Measure of ethnic diversity (ELF) -0.461*** -0.091*** -0.366 -0.057 
(0.18) (0.03) (0.24) (0.04) 
Availability of paved main road 0.035 0.007 0.078 0.012 
 (0.05) (0.01) (0.07) (0.01) 
Availability of piped water -0.110* -0.022* -0.097 -0.015 
 (0.06) (0.01) (0.09) (0.01) 
Number of health care services provided in 
the community health center 
0.005 0.001 0.005 0.001 
(0) (0) (0) (0) 
Distance to the provincial office 0.000* 0.000* 0.001** 0.000** 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Availability of a high school 0.037 0.007 0.288 0.044 
 (0.08) (0.02) (0.2) (0.03) 
Ever experienced disruptions in pipe water 
service in the past year 
0.226*** 0.045*** 0.157* 0.024* 
(0.06) (0.01) (0.09) (0.01) 
   (Continued)  
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(Continued)     
 Random Effect Wooldridge 
 
Coefficient 
Marginal 
Effect Coefficient 
Marginal 
Effect 
Share of population in a village with access 
to electricity 
-0.003*** -0.001*** 0 0 
(0) (0) (0) (0) 
Availability of a technical (non-primitive) 
irrigation system in the village 
-0.137*** -0.027*** -0.187*** -0.029*** 
(0.05) (0.01) (0.07) (0.01) 
Resides in Sumatera -0.201** -0.040** -0.196* -0.030* 
 (0.09) (0.02) (0.11) (0.02) 
 
Resides in Java/Bali -0.167** -0.033** -0.235** -0.036** 
 (0.08) (0.02) (0.11) (0.02) 
Resides in Kalimantan -0.368*** -0.073*** -0.446*** -0.069*** 
(0.12) (0.02) (0.17) (0.03) 
Resides in Sulawesi -0.051 -0.01 -0.667*** -0.103*** 
(0.11) (0.02) (0.19) (0.03) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept -0.652**  -1.398***  
 (0.3)  (0.45)  
Notes: Robust standard errors under coefficients; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients for 
the year dummy are not reported in the table. 
 
The results in Table 2.3 confirm the strong evidence of the state dependence effect of 
poverty in rural Indonesia, as well as the role of public service and community 
infrastructures in the likelihood of poverty. However, one can also argue that the 
differences in public services and community infrastructures may cause poverty, but 
also that poverty itself may have the potential to drive the differences in public 
services and infrastructure facilities.  
Consequently, we extended our analysis by using the lagged values of the public 
services and community infrastructures as regressors to accommodate this issue. We 
find that, similarly to the previous results, the likelihood of being poor is 
significantly associated with poverty status in the previous period (Table 2.4). The 
estimation results using a dynamic random effect probit model indicate that the 
lagged values of the availability of a paved main road in the village, share of the 
population with access to electricity, and the availability of technical (non-primitive) 
irrigation systems are negatively associated with the probability of being poor.  
Furthermore, the lagged values of the distance to the nearest terminal were found to 
be positively related to the probability of being poor. The Wooldridge estimator 
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yields other significant covariates, such as the lagged values of the availability of a 
high school in the village and the ever-experienced disruptions in pipe water 
services. The marginal effect of the lagged dependent variable and the initial state of 
poverty are at a level that is consistent with the results in Table 2.3. 
Table 2.4 Determinants of poverty using the lagged regressors 
 Random Effect Wooldridge 
 
Coefficient 
Marginal 
Effect Coefficient 
Marginal 
Effect 
Poverty status in t = 1 (1993) 0.434*** 0.064*** 
(0.07) (0.01) 
Lagged poverty 0.844*** 0.159*** 0.710*** 0.105*** 
 (0.05) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) 
Own a farm business -0.094** -0.018** -0.209*** -0.031*** 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) 
Own a non-farm business -0.135*** -0.025*** -0.096 -0.014 
 (0.05) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) 
Number of farm business assets -0.017 -0.003 -0.009 -0.001 
 (0.01) (0) (0.01) (0) 
Number of non-farm business assets -0.208*** -0.039*** -0.371*** -0.055*** 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.09) (0.01) 
Age of household head -0.019** -0.004** -0.014 -0.002 
 (0.01) (0) (0.01) (0) 
Age of household head squared 0.000** 0.000** 0 0 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Education of household head: Primary 
school completed 
0.053 0.01 0.036 0.005 
(0.05) (0.01) (0.07) (0.01) 
Education of household head: high school 
(or higher) completed 
-0.347** -0.065** -0.158 -0.023 
(0.15) (0.03) (0.2) (0.03) 
Measure of ethnic diversity (ELF) -0.485*** -0.091*** -0.252 -0.037 
 (0.17) (0.03) (0.23) (0.03) 
Lagged of :     
Availability of paved main road -0.107*** -0.020*** -0.112* -0.017* 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) 
Availability of piped water -0.058 -0.011 -0.081 -0.012 
 (0.05) (0.01) (0.08) (0.01) 
Number of health care services                      
provided in the community health center 
0 0 0.009 0.001 
(0) (0) (0.01) (0) 
Distance to the nearest terminal 0.006** 0.001** -0.004 -0.001 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) 
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 Random Effect Wooldridge 
 Coefficient Marginal 
Effect 
Coefficient Marginal 
Effect 
Distance to the provincial office 0 0 0.000* 0.000* 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Availability of high school 
 
-0.04 -0.007 -0.261*** -0.039*** 
(0.05) (0.01) (0.09) (0.01) 
Ever experienced disruptions in pipe water 
service in the past year 
0.042 0.008 0.158* 0.023* 
(0.07) (0.01) (0.09) (0.01) 
Share of population in a village with access 
to electricity 
-0.001* -0.000* -0.001 0 
(0) (0) (0) (0) 
Availability of technical (non-primitive) 
irrigation system in the village 
-0.127*** -0.024*** -0.127* -0.019* 
 (0.05) (0.01) (0.07) (0.01) 
Resides in Sumatera -0.285*** -0.053*** -0.296*** -0.044*** 
(0.09) (0.02) (0.11) (0.02) 
Resides in Java/Bali -0.297*** -0.056*** -0.371*** -0.055*** 
(0.08) (0.01) (0.1) (0.01) 
Resides in Kalimantan -0.483*** -0.091*** -0.530*** -0.078*** 
(0.12) (0.02) (0.16) (0.02) 
Resides in Sulawesi -0.281** -0.053** -0.847*** -0.125*** 
 (0.12) (0.02) (0.19) (0.03) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept -0.515*  -0.742**  
 (0.28)  (0.38)  
Notes: Robust standard errors under coefficients; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients for 
the year dummy are not reported in the table. 
 
The results imply the importance of the state dependence effect, as well as the 
community characteristics in poverty prevalence. In order to check the consistency of 
the results in our analysis, we use the alternative poverty lines as a reference to 
define the household’s poverty status. We use two international poverty lines - 
$1.25PPP and $2.5PPP a day - in addition to the national poverty line as a reference. 
These international poverty lines are converted to a local currency using 2005 PPP 
and are adjusted by the CPI in 1993, 1997, 2000, and 2007.   
We find that the state dependence effects are consistently statistically significant at 
the 1% level, but with a slightly different magnitude. The Indonesian national 
poverty lines were relatively lower, especially in the first three waves (1993, 1997, 
and 2000), than the international poverty line ($1.25 PPP a day). Hence, it is not 
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surprising to find the magnitude of the state dependence effects as being higher when 
we use $1.25 PPP (a day) as the reference (Table 2.7). The magnitude is even higher 
when we use a moderate international poverty line of $2.5 PPP a day. The marginal 
effect of the initial poverty increases from 7% to 12% when we use the international 
poverty line. 
 
Table 2.5 State dependence effects using various poverty lines 
National povline $1.25 a day (PPP) $2.5 a day (PPP) 
RE WCML RE WCML RE WCML 
Lagged poverty 0.164 0.110 0.205 0.151 0.285 0.250 
Initial poverty 0.071 0.116 0.162 
Note: All coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level. Robust standard errors are 
applied in the model. The covariates are similar to the covariates in the previous tables (Table 2.3 
and Table 2.4). Coefficients for covariates are not reported in the tables. 
 
There are not many country studies on poverty dynamics using a state dependence 
approach, especially for analyzing data from developing countries. This is due the 
requirement of the use of a large set of panel data required to perform such an 
analysis. One study was conducted that used data from Ethiopia (Alem, 2015). In this 
study, a poor urban household was found to have an 8% higher probability of being 
poor in the next period.  
The results illustrate that the state dependence effect in poverty in rural Indonesia is 
slightly higher than what was found in Ethiopia. Other evidence comes from 
Germany, a developed country (Biewen, 2009), with 8%, and Italy, another 
developed country (Giraldo et al., 2002), with a zero effect. However, these two 
studies are not directly comparable with our results, as there is a different nature of 
poverty in developed countries and because they measure the poverty line 
differently. 
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2.6. Conclusions 
This study investigates the dynamics and persistence of poverty in rural Indonesia 
during the period of 1993 – 2007. To better understand the correlates of poverty, a 
longitudinal panel dataset was analyzed.  The IFLS recorded information for  
household conditions and community capital in relation to where the households live  
and what they have access to. We use a standard dynamic random effect model and 
an alternative model that takes state dependence, unobserved individual 
heterogeneity, and the initial conditions problem into account.  
We illustrate that the true state dependence in poverty is statistically significant in 
rural Indonesia. This means that a household’s current poverty status is a substantial 
element that can be used to determine the household’s future state of poverty. 
Therefore, the poverty reduction strategy is not only providing the impact for the 
current poverty level, it is also providing it for the future level of poverty. This 
finding confirms the importance of having poverty reduction strategy aimed at lifting 
people out of poverty like social protection programs. Social protection programs 
intend to promote the poor to move out of poverty and to prevent the non-poor fall in 
to poverty. As explained in the previous chapter that some of social protection 
programs can help directly lift the poor out of poverty e.g. through direct cash 
transfer, in-kind transfer, etc, and some can help reducing poverty through human 
capital accumulation e.g. through conditional cash transfer, scholarship for the poor, 
etc. The government of Indonesia has implemented a range of social protection 
programs as part of its poverty reduction strategy. It includes conditional cash 
transfer, subsidized rice program, scholarship for the poor, health fee waiver for the 
poor, microcredit program, etc.  
In addition to the relevant household (e.g., having a business and assets) and 
household head characteristics (e.g., education of the household head), this paper 
points to the importance of public services and community infrastructure that plays a 
role in poverty prevalence. This result suggests that the targeting method may 
consider including these variables to determine the potential beneficiaries of social 
protection programs. Social protection makes the best of its course when it reaches 
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the neediest people. Therefore, an effective targeting method is essential in designing 
a social protection system in a country. The targeting indicators that have been used 
to determine the potential beneficiaries of social protection programs in Indonesia 
have mostly involved household and housing characteristics (list of indicators are 
presented in the appendix Table A.1 & Table A.2). In 2008, the government started 
to include public services and community infrastructures into PMT variables 
(appendix Table A.3). This study confirms the importance of these variables in 
determining household’s poverty status. However, up to the latest version of PMT in 
2008 and 2011, one variable that is found to be one of important poverty covariates 
in this study has not been included: availability of technical irrigation system. The 
PMT variables may consider including this variable as the estimation results show 
that residing in a village with technical irrigation system decreases the probability of 
being poor in rural area by about 2 - 3%.   
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Chapter 3. Public Spending on Education in a Decentralized 
Indonesia: Do the Poor Benefit? 
 
3.1. Background  
The provision of public services is often associated with governance and institutional 
arrangements. Decentralization, one of the most common governance reforms, has 
been observed to have potential in improving efficiency in public service delivery 
(Oates, 1972; Ahmad and Brosio, 2009; Birner and von Braun, 2015). Indonesia  
implemented such a reform in 2001. Indonesia’s 2001 reform turned the country 
from one of the most centralized systems in the world to one of the most 
decentralized systems (Hofman and Kaiser, 2002). Consequently, the regional share 
in government spending has increased significantly. The responsibilities for 
planning, financing, and providing public services were transferred from the central 
government to the local governments at the district level, with expectations that local 
needs and preferences will be better represented. The evidence for whether 
decentralization plays any role in improving public service delivery, especially the 
public services that matter the most for the poor, is currently inconclusive (Reinikka 
and Svensson, 2001; Barankay and Lockwood, 2006). As such, this paper analyzes 
the effectiveness of decentralized public spending allocated by the local governments 
at the district level in improving public service delivery. 
While there is a relatively large body of literature on the effectiveness of public 
spending on improving outcomes (Gupta, Verhoeven, and Tiongson, 2002), most of 
these studies are based on a cross-country analysis.  This type of analysis is prone to 
data measurement errors and omitted variable bias from country specific historic and 
institutional factors that may influence public spending decisions and outcomes. This 
study analyzes subnational expenditures managed within the same institution and 
data collection setting. Therefore, the analytical framework used in this paper is less 
likely to suffer from omitted variable bias. Moreover, we utilized panel data, which 
enables us to control for subnational time invariant unobserved heterogeneity using a 
fixed effects approach. Another contribution of this paper lies in combining 
subnational budget data and household surveys for a 10 year period and, at the same 
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time, capturing the year when the decentralization took place for the first time. 
Therefore, we have a reasonably adequate observation periods after the 
decentralization came into force. Decentralization is a process; this process requires 
time to produce benefits. As such, impacts are not expected to appear after a short 
period of implementation; instead, long run impacts are expected. 
This paper attempts to investigate the impact of decentralized public education 
spending allocated by local governments on secondary school net enrolment rates, 
transition rates to secondary school, and the number of junior secondary schools per 
1000 secondary school aged children. The reason for focusing on secondary schools 
is because enrolment rates in primary schools in Indonesia have been stable and 
above 90% since the 1990s, while the rates of enrollment in secondary schools is far 
lower.  
In 2010, two-thirds and one-half of secondary school aged children enrolled in junior 
and senior secondary schools, respectively. During that time, while 90 percent of 
children from the richest quintile continued their education to a junior secondary 
school, only 45% of children of the same age from the poorest households made it 
through Grade 7. The poor students were left behind. As such, vertical inequality 
across socio-economic groups exists.  Horizontal inequality across regions also 
exists. Women aged 15-49 in West Kalimantan have completed a median of only 6 
years of primary school. In the Riau islands, women in the same age group have 
completed the second grade of senior secondary school (11 years of schooling), on 
average.  
Many researchers across the globe stress the importance of the continuation of an 
education through the secondary school level. Barro and Lee (1994) reveal that 
secondary school attainment plays a significant role in economic growth. Post-
primary education is also confirmed as a useful means for reducing inequality, 
especially among wage-earners (Knight and Sabott, 1987). In general, more educated 
people receive better earnings and are more productive, as compared to less educated 
people (Psacharopoulos, 1985; Jamison and Lau, 1982).  
Instead of using student test scores as an educational measure, this paper uses net 
enrolment rates, school transition rates, and ratio of student per school to represent 
education outcomes. This is due to the limitation on reliable data of student test 
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scores in Indonesia. Although many researchers argue that the quality of schooling, 
measured using student test scores, is more important and relevant of an educational 
measure than the quantity of schooling (Hanushek and Kimko, 2000), the 
quantitative measures used in this paper, especially net enrolment rates and school 
transition rates, have also been used in many influential studies and interpreted as 
credible indicators for future success in the labor market (Behrman and Birdsall, 
1983; Knight and Sabot, 1987, 1990; Barro, 2001).  
3.2 Brief Overview of the Indonesian Educational System 
The government of Indonesia has committed to extend basic education for all from 6 
to 9 years.  This includes 6 years of primary school and 3 years of junior secondary 
school3. Students that graduate from junior secondary school can continue to regular 
senior secondary school or a vocational senior secondary school. Both regular and 
vocational senior secondary schools offer a three-year program. Regular senior 
secondary students who passed the national exams could continue to a tertiary 
education in a university for a bachelor’s degree, master’s degree, and/or doctoral 
degree. On the other hand, vocational senior secondary school prepares its graduates 
to enter the labor market by providing technical programs to build a specific 
competency unit, like engineering, technology, or business management.  
Students from poor households largely drop out before finishing one educational 
level (Figure 3.1). The largest dropout rate occurred from the last grade in primary 
school (junior secondary) to the first grade in junior secondary school (senior 
secondary). Although we can see some improvements in educational attainment over 
the past decade, the gaps between the rich and the poor are increasing. In 2001, the 
population of people over 26 years of age who had attained at least six and nine years 
of education was 64% and 32%, respectively. These numbers increased to 77% and 
46% in 2010. In 2001, dropout rates from Grades 9 through 10 were 55% for the 
poorest decile and 23% for the richest decile. In 2010, the dropout rates worsened to 
57% for the poorest decile; they improved to 17% for the richest decile.  
  
																																																													
3	National	Education	Law No. 2/1989.	
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Figure 3.1 Educational attainment by quintile monthly per capita expenditures 
 
Source: Own calculations using Susenas (Survey Sosial Ekonomi Nasional/National Socio-economic 
Survey), 2001 and 2010 data. 
The large gap across regions in the quality and quantity of schools, and other 
supporting infrastructure for education, has left some regions far behind other 
regions in terms of educational attainment. Some improvement exists over the last 
decade; however, the inequality across regions in educational achievement remains 
high (Figure 3.2).  
 
Figure 3.2 Educational attainment by region 
   
Source: Own calculations using Susenas, 2001 and 2010 
Figures 3.1 and 3.2  show that transition rates to secondary school, from Grade 6 to 7 
and from Grade 9 to 10, are a serious problem in Indonesia. Therefore, in addition to 
the standard measure of education (e.g., net enrolment rates), we also analyze the 
transition rates to junior and senior secondary school as one of our dependent 
variables. 
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Although the Indonesian government has stated that compulsory basic education is 
free for all of its citizens, schools still charge various fees to parents. The educational 
module of Susenas (National Socio Economy Survey) in 2009 recorded household 
expenditures on education that covers fees charged by schools and other related costs 
in accessing an education. These out-of-pocket costs are important educational 
barriers for poor households.  
Figure 3.3 illustrates that the average annual educational expenditures for a primary, 
a junior, and a senior secondary student are about IDR 1.1 million, 1.8 million, and 
2.6 million, respectively. These amounts account for a significant proportion of total 
household expenditures. For example, educational expenditures for a junior (senior) 
secondary student, on average, account for a third (a half) of total household 
expenditures. For poor households, these amounts are simply  not affordable. 
Among items that are paid directly to schools, tuition and registration fees are the 
two biggest components, especially in junior secondary and senior secondary schools 
(Figure 3.3). Among all of the household expenditures on education, transportation 
costs to a school account for the biggest share; this value is typically much greater 
than the school fees. 
Figure 3.3 Annual out-of-pocket costs per student 
 
Source: Own calculations Susenas, 2009 
High transportation costs to a school are possibly due to the average village distance 
to the school being considerably far, or not walkable, especially in the rural areas 
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schools in the past decade. Rural areas have always suffered from large distances to 
educational facilities. The most reachable schools in rural areas are only at the 
primary school level. The nearest junior and senior high schools are typically not in 
walking distance.  
Table 3.1 illustrates that the average distance to a primary school has slightly 
increased. This is due to the proliferation at the district down to the village level. 
Many new villages have been formed (Minister of Home Affairs Regulation no. 
28/2006) without ensuring the sufficiency of operating educational facilities. The 
government has not placed any specific effort in reducing transportation costs to 
schools through free school busses or transportation vouchers. 
Table 3.1 Average village distance to the nearest school (in km) 
Year Area Kindergarten 
Primary 
School 
Junior High 
School 
Senior High 
School 
2000 
Urban 0.49 0.03 0.62 1.45 
Rural 11.88 0.45 6.84 15.76 
Total 10.64 0.40 6.17 14.21 
2003 
Urban 0.53 0.05 0.87 1.70 
Rural 13.00 0.70 7.55 16.17 
Total 10.83 0.58 6.39 13.65 
2005 
Urban 0.39 0.06 0.77 3.51 
Rural 11.17 0.77 7.21 16.53 
Total 9.28 0.64 6.07 14.24 
2008 
Urban 0.25 0.06 0.78 2.90 
Rural 8.95 0.82 5.71 13.87 
Total 7.50 0.69 4.88 12.04 
Source: Own calculations using Podes (Village Potential Survey), various years. Note: Distance is measured from the village to 
the nearest school. When the nearest school is located in a village, the distance calculated will be zero. 
In a multi-developing countries study, Huisman and Smits (2009) show that the 
distance to a school is one of the main variables in parental decisions regarding a 
child’s education. Therefore, it is not surprising to find that children from poor 
households who live far away from a school are more likely to drop-out of school 
(Colclough et al., 2000; Glick and Sahn, 2006).  
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Discrepancies between districts or provinces are similarly large (Figure 3.4). Most 
villages in Java have educational facilities from primary to senior secondary school. 
However, in the eastern part of Indonesia, children have to travel over 20 km to 
access a senior secondary education. In this way, a lack of accessible roads and 
affordable transportation can become a serious issues in terms of attending a school.  
More specifically, only about 60% of villages have a paved main road. The other 
40% have either soil or a hardened road as their main road.4  
Figure 3.4 Average distance to the nearest senior secondary school 
 
Source: Own calculations using Podes, 2008 
 
The Indonesian government has attempted to help the poor access educational 
facilities. There was a large school construction program from 1974-1978, during 
which time the government built over 61,000 primary schools. This program 
increased school enrolments and the participation of its graduates in the labor force 
(Duflo, 2004). However, there was no continuation of this program to build more 
junior and senior high schools. Therefore, many rural children must go to 
neighboring subdistricts or district capitals to access high schools. At the end of the 
1990s, the government introduced a School Grants initiative that intended to cover 
school fees for households affected by the Asian Financial Crisis. In the early 2000s, 
the government reduced the fuel subsidy and shifted the budget allocation towards 
financial assistance for poor students through the BKM (Bantuan Khusus Murid or 
Special Assistance for Students) program.  
																																																													
4 Own calculations using Podes (Village Potential Census) 2008. 
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In 2005, the government launched a new school grants program: BOS (Bantuan 
Operasi Sekolah or School Operational funds). In 2008-2009, the government 
introduced the BSM (Bantuan Siswa Miskin or Assistance for Poor Students) to help 
poor students overcome financial difficulties in accessing schools. Nevertheless, in 
recent years, poor households remain left behind in educational achievement.  
The trend of public education spending has been increasing in the past decade, both 
as a percentage of total national expenditures and a percentage of GDP. Compared to 
other middle-income countries, Indonesia still spends less on education. However, 
compared to its neighboring countries, Indonesia spends more than Cambodia, the 
Philippines, Lao, or Singapore (World Bank, 2013). Despite the amount of public 
spending on education, according to the PISA scores by the OECD, Indonesian 
students perform the worst in the region and rank 64 out of 65 participating countries 
in terms of student performance in mathematics, reading, and science.   
As in many other developing countries, the Indonesian government has implemented 
several reforms to improve educational outcomes.  These reforms include increasing 
the amount of  public spending on education, as well as a decentralizing provision of 
educational services to the local government. The amendment of the Indonesian 
Constitution, passed in 2002, obliges the government to prioritize a minimum of 20% 
of both the national and local government’s budget for the education sector. The 
consequences of this amendment, also known as the 20 percent rule, create a large 
amount of additional resources to spend by local governments (World Bank, 2013).  
Without proper monitoring from the central government or an independent party, 
these extra resources could lead to an inefficiency utilization of public spending by 
local governments. Ensuring sufficient budgets of  public expenditures on education 
is one important key in improving educational outcomes. However, it has to be 
accompanied by improving the educational quality, as low-quality schooling 
disproportionately hurts the poor and limits their future earning opportunities 
(Thomas et al., 2000).  
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Therefore, it is crucially important to measure the effectiveness of this spending in 
the first place, before providing policy recommendations to improve its 
effectiveness. This paper attempts to shed some light on this issue by analyzing the 
relationship between decentralized public spending on education with educational 
outcomes at the secondary school level. 
3.3. Brief overview of decentralization in Indonesia 
Decentralization in Indonesia was originally driven by issues related to an inadequate 
sharing of natural resources that caused some regions to be left behind other regions 
(Agustina et al., 2012). Hence, the ultimate goal of decentralization in Indonesia is to 
ensure that all regions can enjoy the fruits of development and meet public service 
standards.  
Decentralization in Indonesia came into force in 2001. It began when a law 
concerning local administration and a law concerning fiscal balance were approved 
by the Parliament5 6. Under these laws, a strictly hierarchical relationship between 
the central government, provinces, and districts was abolished. In its place, a 
government financing system was established to ensure inter-regional equity in a 
fiscal capacity. Since then, the implementation and daily operations of activities in 
the various sectors, including education, have been reassigned from the central 
government to the local government at the district level. 
Fiscal decentralization can be viewed as two different kinds of autonomy; autonomy 
from the revenue side (e.g., authority in collecting taxes or revenue from other 
sources) and autonomy from the expenditure side (e.g., allocating a budget for 
expenditures in each sector or activity). In the case of Indonesia, the level of 
authority for local governments to generate revenue and managing expenditures are 
significantly different. In generating revenue, the local government has only been 
given a limited authority to collect local taxes. The sources of applicable local taxes 
mostly come from hotel taxes, restaurant taxes, and motor vehicle taxes. The tax 
ratio (out of GRDP/Gross Regional Domestic Product) varies across district 
governments. The lowest ratio in 2003 was 0.4% for West Papua and the highest 
																																																													
5	Law 22/1999	
6	Law 25/1999	
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ratio was 9.4% for DKI Jakarta. The average tax ratio is only 2.1% (Ministry of 
Finance (MoF), 2013). The major sources of tax revenue are still managed by the 
central government. The central government then provides financing to the local 
governments through various transfer mechanisms; DAU (Dana Alokasi Umum or 
General Allocation Funds), DAK (Dana Alokasi Khusus or Special Allocation 
Funds), DBH (Dana Bagi Hasil or Revenue Sharing Funds) and Special Autonomy 
Funds, which, on average, account for about two-thirds of the local governments 
total revenue (MoF, 2013). Therefore, with the current government regulations, the 
level of dependency of the local government on the central government in terms of 
receiving revenue is still high. 
On the other hand, local governments have full authority in deciding on budget 
allocations. The central government no longer has the power to influence local 
governments in planning and managing their budgets. This creates complexities in 
establishing accountability relationships between the source of the revenue, which  
mostly comes from the central government, and public spending purposes, which are 
decided upon locally. Hence, under decentralization, there is a missing link between 
the revenue and the expenditures at the district level, especially because the 
monitoring and review of budget execution and activities conducted by the local 
governments are currently not yet in place. This accountability problem has created 
an opinion that decentralization in Indonesia is much more of an administrative 
decentralization, rather than a fiscal decentralization (Green, 2005).  This condition 
has even become more complicated, as most Indonesian districts are found to spend 
more on administrative purposes, not on public services (Sjahrir et al., 2014).  
The government has issued government regulations concerning the formation, 
merging, and liquidation of local governments7. This regulation stated that regions 
are entitled to propose their separation from their original regions, as long as they 
meet all technical, administrative, and physical requirements for bringing greater 
prosperity to their citizens. This regulation could encourage local governments to 
separate and create a new local government to reap the additional benefits of central 
government transfers (Green, 2005). Consequently, the total number of subnational 
																																																													
7 PP (Peraturan Pemerintah / Government Regulation)129/2000 
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governments increased from 30 provinces and 338 municipalities in 2000 to 33 
provinces and 497 municipalities in 2012.  
3.4. Decentralization and Public Service Delivery 
The differences in governance structures (e.g., centralized, decentralized) could lead 
to variations in the performance of public services. As one of the most common 
governance reforms, decentralization has the potential to improve efficiency in 
public service delivery by better representing the heterogeneity of local needs and 
knowledge (Oates, 1972).  
Birner and von Braun (2015) argue that decentralization could improve the provision 
of public services that is significantly important for the poor through two linkages: 
(1) demand-side linkages, by strengthening the ability of the poor to demand better 
services and hold service providers accountable, and (2) supply-side linkages, by 
strengthening the incentives and the capacity of public agencies to improve the 
efficiency of public service delivery to the poor. 
There are several reasons why decentralization is expected to improve public service 
delivery. First, aggregate spending by the central government allocated for public 
services have not had a significant impact (Filmer and Pritchet, 1999). Ahmad et al. 
(2006) examine the nexus between decentralization and improved service delivery 
and argue that the attempts to bolster aggregate spending on public services to the 
central level have not had a significant impact. This is partly due to the central 
government being unable to ensure that the funding actually reaches the target group.  
Reinikka and Svensson (2001) show that in Uganda, money from government 
spending did not often reach the frontline service provider. Hence, intermediate 
institutions should better distribute and manage resources from the central 
government to the end users. Decentralization could accommodate this issue by 
giving responsibility to the local government as the intermediate institution.  
Second, most public services can be more efficiently improved under 
decentralization because most public services are consumed and provided locally. By 
being given more authority and responsibility, local governments might be more 
responsive to local needs and preferences (Wallis and Oates, 1998; Shah, 1999).   
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However, there are also many criticisms against decentralization, especially for 
implementation in developing countries. Local governments in developing countries 
may lack the capacity to provide public services and efficiently meet local demands 
(Prud'homme, 1995, Tanzi et al., 1996; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006). 
Furthermore, benefits from decentralization often do not go to the poor.  They go to  
the better-off and are often captured by the local elite (Galasso and Ravallion, 2000; 
Mansuri and Rao, 2004; Soto et al., 2012). 
The majority of previous studies have examined impact decentralization on 
macroeconomic performance (Zhang and Zou, 1998; Iimi, 2005; Rodiriguez-Pose 
and Kroijer; 2009). A few authors address the impact of decentralization on the real 
outcomes of service delivery in the health and educational sector. The results seem 
promising in the developed countries (Barankay and Lockwood, 2006; Salinas and 
Sole-Olle, 2008). However, these positive outcomes might be different in the case of 
developing countries, especially where the capacity of local governments varies 
widely.  
Barankay and Lockwood (2006) examine the relationship between decentralization 
and educational outcomes in Switzerland using a fixed effects and instrumental 
variable method. They show that decentralization was positively associated with 
educational outcomes. Jimenez and Smith (2005) use panel data from ten provinces 
in Canada to examine the impact of health care decentralization on the population’s 
health. They apply a fixed effects method and Instrumental Variable (IV) techniques 
to tackle unobservable omitted variable bias and endogenous regressors, 
respectively. Their analysis reveal that decentralization reduces infant mortality. 
Salinas and Sole-Olle (2009) apply the difference-in-differences method to estimate 
the effect of decentralization in Spain on educational outcomes. Decentralization in 
Spain took place in the regions at different points in time. Therefore, they were able 
to use the non-decentralized autonomous regions as the comparison group to 
estimate the effect of decentralization on educational survival rates: the proportion of 
students enrolled in the last course of compulsory educational that continue to the 
next grade. They also find a positive effect of decentralization.  
Few authors have examined the impact of decentralization in developing countries. 
The evidence that has been found is rather mixed. Habibi et al. (2003) apply the 
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fixed effects model to a large set of panel data for Argentina and found that 
decentralization had a positive, significant impact on secondary enrollment ratios. 
Using a random-effects method and IV technique using the lagged of a suspected 
endogenous regressor, Faguet and Sánchez (2006) show that decentralization 
improved public school enrollment. Galiani et al. (2008) apply the difference-in-
difference method to a panel dataset from 1994-1999 at the school level to measure 
the impact of transferring authority for a school from the central to the provincial 
government in Argentina. Their analysis reveal that even though the student test 
scores improved, decentralization degraded the service provision in poor 
communities. Kalirajan and Otsuka (2012) analyze the effect of decentralization on 
agricultural development using a fixed effects regression model on panel data from 
25 states covering 2001-2003. They show that transfers made to the lowest level of 
local government (Panchayati Raj) had a positive and statistically significant impact 
on agricultural development. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the impact was almost 
negligible.  
Inconsistent impacts found from developing countries are not surprising, because the 
success of decentralization very much depends on institutional conditions and 
management capacities (von Braun and Grote, 2002), which vary significantly in a 
less mature economy. 
Several studies have discussed decentralization in Indonesia, both in the context of 
its process/implementation, as well as its outcomes. Kristiansen and Pratikno (2006) 
descriptively assess educational sector performance in the decentralization era 
through both a quantitative and qualitative analysis. They find that there is no 
transparency and accountability in the administration of educational services, that 
household expenditures on education are high and increasing, and that social and 
geographical disparities remain large.  
Chowdury et al. (2009) examine the impact of a decentralization policy on the local 
infrastructure provision in Indonesia. They use village-level panel surveys to 
compare two periods of time: 1996-2000 and 2000-2006to capture the pre- and post- 
decentralization, respectively. By applying an ordered probit model, they estimate 
the change (deterioration, no change, or improvement) in local public goods (roads, 
schools, and health facilities) on local income (proportion of households living in 
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poverty). Their analysis reveal that, despite the transfer from the central to the local 
government following the decentralization, local public goods still depended on local 
resources. Hence, poorer villages had fewer public goods than richer villages.  
Kruse et al. (2012) use Indonesian panel data at the district level from 2001-2004 and 
apply a marginal benefit incidence analysis that incorporated behavioral responses to 
changes in public health spending. They find that the increased public health 
spending at district level increased the utilization of outpatient care in the public 
health facilities for the poorest two quartiles. However, these behavioral changes are 
relatively small, when compared to the initial utilization shares.  
The previous empirical studies limited their analysis to short panel data that may not 
yet capture the real effect of decentralization (Kalirajan and Otsuka, 2012; Chowdury 
et al., 2009; Kruse et al., 2012).  Some studies did not empirically test the hypothesis 
and address the issue of the possibility of endogeneity (Kristiansen and Pratikno, 
2006; Habibit et al., 2003). Consequently, this study aims to contribute to the limited 
research devoted to the impacts of decentralization on public service delivery in 
developing countries, especially in Indonesia.  This is accomplished by utilizing a 
large set of panel data capturing a decade of data after the decentralization reform 
took place. This study also looks at the distributional issues by examining these 
impacts on educational outcomes for the poor.  
3.5. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
This paper uses two data sources: regional budget data and household survey data. 
The first set of data was obtained from the Ministry of Finance. The latter set of data 
was obtained from the Indonesian Bureau of Statistics (BPS).  
Regional budget data was collected from the Regional Financial Information System 
(Sistem Informasi Keuangan Daerah/SIKD) of the Ministry of Finance. This data 
contains details on Local Government Revenues and Expenditures (APBD) (e.g., 
General Allocation Fund (DAU), Special Allocation Fund (DAK), revenue sharing 
fund, local government own revenue) and a classification of expenditures by function 
(e.g., health, education, social protection).  
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The revenue data was available from 1994 through 2012. However, the function 
classification of the expenditure data was only available from 2001 to 2009. It would 
have been very useful if we could include the expenditure data before the 
decentralization period (2001), when the fiscal authority was fully managed by the 
central government. Unfortunately, the regional budget data does not have 
comparable classifications and disaggregation levels for the classification of 
expenditures between before- and after- the decentralization.  
Instead of comparing the before- and after- decentralization data, this paper utilizes 
data from the beginning of the decentralization up to the latest available regional 
budget data. To make use of this data, we map and match different budget rules that 
were inconsistent across the fiscal years. To accomplish this task, we followed the 
mapping procedure developed by the World Bank (2009). Furthermore, as the 
decentralization resulted in district proliferation (from 313 in 2001 to 497 in 2012), 
we used district code links (crosswalk) to match the district ID across the various 
years to make panel data at the district level. 
In the era of decentralization, district expenditures on education accounts for about 
half of the total national expenditures on education (Figure 3.5). The regional budget 
dataset used in this paper accounts for 90% of the district expenditures. The missing 
10% of the data on district expenditures are due to unreported expenditures from 
local governments to the Ministry of Finance. Although this means that the analysis 
from this study may not represent all local governments in Indonesia, the results still 
hold for most Indonesian districts. 
Figure 3.5 Composition of educational expenditures 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance 
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Susenas is a nationally representative survey conducted by the BPS annually, 
biannually, or quarterly (depending on the survey year) at the household and 
individual level. The survey is representative of each of Indonesia’s provinces or 
districts (depending on the survey year). The Susenas has a core module which 
covers various aspects of socio-economic and consumption modules, which record 
details of household food and non-food expenditures.  
This study used Susenas data from 2001-2012. Since our main objective is to analyze 
the effectiveness of  public education spending on educational outcomes at the 
district level, we aggregate the household survey data up to the district level before 
matching it to the regional budget data. The main variables from Susenas include the 
child status of school enrolment, which is translated into our dependent variables: 
secondary school net enrolment rates,  transition rates to secondary school, and other 
demographic variables (e.g., share of urban population, share of the poor, share of 
female population, share of school aged children, average age and household size, 
and average educational attainment that is calculated by years of schooling).  
Table 3.2  provides the summary statistics for all variables used in the estimation. 
We analyze educational outcomes for the poor and non-poor population. 8  The 
outcomes for the poor are much lower than those for the non-poor, while the 
outcomes of the non-poor are higher than the average of the total population. This 
applies to both main outcomes (e.g., net enrolment rates and the transition rates to 
secondary school). This confirms the background information in the previous section 
in that the poor are left behind in terms of educational performance. Each local 
government spends a varied amount on education. Public expenditures on education 
per school aged child vary from less than USD 1 to USD 1,153 (1 USD = 13,000 
IDR) annually.  
 
  
																																																													
8 	An individual is considered poor if his/her monthly per capita expenditures are below the national poverty line. The 
Indonesian poverty line is determined by the BPS (Badan Pusat Statistik, Statistics Indonesia). It is based on the average of 
what the poor spend on different kinds of food to reach 2,100 calories per day and non-food items to cover the costs of housing, 
clothing, education and health care. The poverty line takes into account the variation of prices across regions.		
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Table 3.2 Summary Statistics 
Mean Std Dev Min. Max 
Net enrolment rates at the secondary school level 0.54 0.12 0.07 0.88 
Net enrolment rates of the non-poor at the secondary school 
level 0.57 0.12 0.07 0.91 
Net enrolment rates of the poor at the secondary school level 0.41 0.16 0.00 0.96 
Transition rates to high school 0.58 0.12 0.21 0.86 
Transition rates to high school of the non-poor 0.60 0.12 0.21 0.87 
Transition rates to high school of the poor 0.40 0.14 0.00 0.88 
Natural logarithm of local government’s public education 
spending per school aged child 13.92 0.84 6.33 16.47 
Share of local government's educational expenditures out of 
total expenditures 0.33 0.12 0.00 0.70 
Share of local government's own revenue out of total 
revenue 0.07 0.06 0.00 0.69 
Natural logarithm of real Gross Regional Domestic Product 15.43 0.73 12.68 19.42 
Share of urban population 0.37 0.32 0.00 1.00 
Share of poor population 0.17 0.09 0.00 0.83 
Share of female population 0.50 0.02 0.36 0.64 
Share of school aged children 0.27 0.04 0.14 0.44 
Average age 28.00 2.77 21.01 37.76 
Average household size 4.10 0.44 2.68 6.62 
Average Educational attainment  6.07 1.11 1.48 10.08 
Number of junior secondary school per 1000 junior-
secondary aged children 3.30 1.88 0.00 27.08 
Share of villages with flatland topography 0.65 0.27 0.00 1.00 
Share of villages that ever experienced natural disaster 0.30 0.24 0.00 1.00 
Share of villages with access to proper main road 0.65 0.27 0.00 1.00 
Source: Own calculations 
In order to obtain a comprehensive picture of the education sector in Indonesia, we  
also analyze the supply-side factors of education with the number of junior 
secondary schools per 1000 junior-secondary aged children. The information about 
school availability is taken from Podes (Village Potential Census). Podes is a village 
census carried out by the BPS. It collects information about village characteristics 
and facilities from the village head or other designated village representative. Podes 
is conducted every three years.  
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For this particular analysis, we combine the three datasets (i.e., regional budget data, 
Susenas, and Podes) for the years of 2003, 2006, 2008, and 2011 (following the year 
when Podes data became available). We similarly aggregate the information at the 
household level from Susenas and the village level from Podes up to the district level 
to match it with the regional budget data. We include additional covariates on the 
village characteristics from Podes, such as the village’s topography, experience with 
natural disasters in the last 3 years that causes losses/damage, and access to proper 
main roads (asphalt-type roads and roads accessible by four-wheeled vehicles 
throughout the year). 
 
3.6. Estimation Strategy 
The econometric specification used to analyze the relationship between public 
spending on education and educational outcomes is: 
 
௜ܻ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚܧ௜௧ି௝ ൅ ߛܦ௜௧ ൅ ߜ௧ ൅ ݑ௜௧                                (1) 
 
where ܻ represents educational outcomes with the subscript i representing the district 
and subscript t representing time. The outcomes examined using Equation (1)  are 
high school net enrolment rates (junior and senior high school) and transition rates to 
high schools (from primary to junior high and from junior high to senior high 
school).  ܧ  is the natural logarithm of the per capita district public educational 
expenditures.  
We use the outcome in t and the educational spending in t-j to take into account the 
possible lags in the effect of public spending on education. We use j=0,1,2   to 
perform the sensitivity analysis. The lagged regressor is also intended to overcome 
the reverse causality concern, since it has been argued that while educational 
spending may contribute to better educational outcomes, educational outcomes may 
also influence the level of public expenditures allocated by the local governments.  
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ܦ is a set of variables used to control the district characteristics.  They include the 
average age of the population, share of school aged children, average household size, 
average educational attainment, share of the population living in an urban area, share 
of female population, natural logarithm of regional GDP per capita,  and share of the 
poor population. ߜ  is a year dummy used to pick up aggregate time shocks; ݑ௜௧ is 
the residual. In the second specification, we include region dummies9. 
In our analysis of the supply-side factor on education, we estimate the relationship of 
public spending with the school supply using: 
 
௜ܻ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚܧ௜௧ି௝ ൅ ߛܦ௜௧ ൅ ߲ ௜ܸ௧ ൅ ߠܴ௜ ൅ ߜ௧ ൅ ݑ௜௧                                (2) 
 
As explained in the previous section, data on school supply (number of junior 
secondary schools per 1000 junior-secondary aged children) are taken from the 
village census. Therefore, in Equation (2), we are able to include an additional 
regressors, ௜ܸ௧- village geographical characteristics (e.g., village topography, natural 
disaster experience, and access to proper main road).  This information was  recorded 
in the census. 
The econometric models were estimated using: (1) an OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) 
regression as a baseline comparison, (2) an FE (fixed effects) model, and (3) an IV 
(instrumental variable) method. In the OLS model, we use cluster-robust standard 
errors that were clustered at the district as our observational unit. To tackle possible 
bias that may result from time invariant unobserved district specific effects, we 
include district fixed effects in the second model. Since the regressor of interest 
varies by district-year, we cannot include the district-year dummies to control for the 
district specific shocks. However, in the educational sector context, district-specific 
shocks rarely directly impact the educational outcomes used in our analysis10.  
  
																																																													
9 Regions are defined as 7 main islands/archipelagos: Sumatera, Java/Bali, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Nusa Tenggara, Maluku, and 
Papua. 
10	In	the	health	sector,	district‐specific	health	shocks	(e.g.,	floods	or	droughts)	may	directly	impact	health	
outcomes,	such	as	infant	mortality	or	children/adult	health	status.		
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Another concern in our model specification is that public spending on education 
could be endogenously determined. It can be jointly determined with our 
independent variables (e.g., educational outcomes). To address the endogeneity 
problem, we apply the IV (Instrumental Variable) method by using the lagged 
value(s) of  public education spending and the population size as instruments and 
compare the results with the first two methods. Public spending in one sector is 
usually correlated with a budget allocated for the sector that is usually determined by 
the amount of the previous year’s spending. Furthermore, population size is one of 
the adjustment factors used by governments in allocating their resources. Both 
instruments have a high correlation with our endogenous regressor, but are not 
correlated with the dependent variable. We also perform several tests for instrument 
validity; these results are discussed in the next section. 
 
3.7. Discussion of the Results 
Our estimation results were first derived from the pooled OLS model (as a baseline 
comparison) using three different specifications (Table 3.3). The pooled OLS 
estimates indicate that the effect of district public spending on enrolment rates is not 
significant when the region dummies are not included in the regressors (column 1). 
The coefficient of district public spending on education becomes positive and 
statistically significant, but nonetheless very small, when the region dummies are 
included (column 2). More specifically, the results illustrate that for a 10 percent 
increase in the district per capita public spending on education, we expect a 0.1% 
increase in secondary school net enrolment rates. The coefficients become lower 
when we use the lagged value of public spending, instead of the current value of 
public education spending (Table 3.3, Column 3).  
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Table 3.3 Net enrolment of secondary schools – Pooled OLS 
Dependent variable: Net enrolment of secondary schools 
 (1) (2) (3)   
Ln (real GRDP per capita) 
0.0206*** 0.0250*** 0.0283***    
(0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0050)    
Ln (district's educational spending per school aged 
child) 
0.00401 0.0113***    
(0.0035) (0.0033)    
Lagged of Ln (district's educational spending per 
school aged child) 
0.00977***  
(0.0034)    
Share of urban population -0.0159 -0.0247 -0.0221    
(0.0144) (0.0173) (0.0176)    
Share of poor population 0.0946** 0.0496 0.0719*    
(0.0398) (0.0354) (0.0417)    
Share of female population -0.244 -0.212 -0.258    
(0.1550) (0.1420) (0.1690)    
Average age of population 0.0239*** 0.0212*** 0.0212***    
(0.0018) (0.0020) (0.0021)    
Average household size 0.0274*** 0.0185* 0.0128    
(0.0099) (0.0105) (0.0104)    
Share of school aged children in the population 
1.015*** 0.965*** 0.982***    
(0.1370) (0.1400) (0.1450)    
Average years of schooling 
0.0926*** 0.0880*** 0.0854***    
(0.0048) (0.0052) (0.0051)    
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes    
Region dummies No Yes Yes    
Constant 
-1.333*** -1.340*** -1.337***    
(0.1340) (0.1290) (0.1360)    
Observations 2,787 2,787 2,452    
R-squared 0.676 0.698 0.68    
Notes: Clustered standard errors are in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients for 
the year dummy are not reported in the table. 
 
Table 3.4 shows the fixed effects estimates, when we control for the time invariant 
unobserved district specific effect. The results confirm that the effect of the districts 
public education spending is not significantly different from zero (Column 1). We 
also modify the model using the lagged value of public education spending, instead 
of its current value. The coefficient still appears to be insignificant (Column 2). We 
use both lag (1) and lag (2) for a robustness check (Column 2 and 3). In Columns 4 
and 5, both the current and lagged value of public education spending are included in 
the model. We again do not find a significant effect on the outcomes measured – the 
net enrolment rates of secondary school. 
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Table 3.4 Net enrolment of secondary schools – Fixed effects 
Dependent variable: Net enrolment of secondary school 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)    
Ln (real GRDP per capita) 
0.0161* 0.00964 -0.00129 0.0163 0.00377    
(0.0093) (0.0095) (0.0100) (0.0104) (0.0120)   
Ln (district's educational spending per 
school aged child) 
0.00166 -0.000978 -0.00313    
(0.0024) (0.0031) (0.0043)    
Lag (1) of Ln (district's educational 
spending per school aged child) 
0.00143 0.000861 0.0026    
(0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0044)    
Lag (2) of Ln (district's educational 
spending per school aged child) 
0.000502 0.000603    
(0.0024) (0.0033)    
Share of urban population -0.00876 0.00416 -0.0014 -0.0175 -0.016    
(0.0289) (0.0361) (0.0330) (0.0298) (0.0403)    
Share of poor population -0.121*** -0.185** -0.176** -0.221** -0.250***    
(0.0354) (0.0791) (0.0705) (0.0863) (0.0881)    
Share of female population -0.0524 -0.129 -0.269** -0.127 -0.146    
(0.0895) (0.1080) (0.1090) (0.1160) (0.1260)    
Average age of population 0.000174 0.000341 0.00309 0.000399 0.00186    
(0.0024) (0.0029) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0034)    
Average household size 0.0191** 0.00899 0.0211*** 0.0132 0.0229**    
(0.0077) (0.0084) (0.0072) (0.0098) (0.0095)    
Share of school aged children in the 
population 
0.397*** 0.481*** 0.451*** 0.372*** 0.211    
(0.1170) (0.1320) (0.1360) (0.1420) (0.1460)    
Average years of schooling 
0.0700*** 0.0646*** 0.0578*** 0.0680*** 0.0634***    
(0.0063) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0072) (0.0078)    
Constant 
-0.293* -0.133 0.0813 -0.207 0.00352    
(0.1710) (0.1890) (0.2110) (0.2010) (0.2480)    
   
Observations 2787 2452 2110  2167  1648    
R-squared 0.8724 0.8709 0.8691  0.8777  0.8797    
Number of id_m 414 401 383  395  351    
Notes: Clustered standard errors are in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients for 
the year dummy are not reported in the table. 
 
Table 3.5 illustrates the estimation results using three different methods for the first 
educational outcomes, secondary school net enrolment rates, for both the poor and 
non-poor population. The OLS and FE estimates illustrate consistent results (i.e., 
insignificant relationship between the district’s public education spending and 
district’s educational outcomes for both the poor and non-poor). On the other hand, 
when the public education spending is treated as an endogenous regressor, our IV 
estimates show that the coefficient of interest is small, positive, and significant for 
the non-poor, but insignificant for the poor. The instruments used are the lags of the 
suspected endogenous variables and the natural logarithm of the district’s population. 
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We perform an Anderson test (under-identification test) that examines whether our 
instruments identify the equations, while the Cragg-Donald test (weak identification 
test) analyzes whether our instruments suffer from a weak instrument problem. The 
Anderson and Cragg-Donald tests illustrate that our instruments identify the second-
stage equation and that our instruments are reasonably strong (Chi-sq (2) = 21.45 and 
Wald F stat = 10.755). The IV results illustrate that for a 10 percent increase in the 
district per capita public spending on education, we expect a 1.5% increase in 
secondary school net enrolment rates of the non-poor. The estimated impact is much 
lower when the lagged values of district public spending used instead of its current 
value. The estimation results are presented in appendix (Table A.4 and Table A.6). 
By including the first lagged values of district’s public spending on education, we 
expect 0.3% increase in the secondary school net enrolment rates of the non-poor for 
a 10% increase in the education public spending. While including the second lagged 
of district’s public spending on education results 0.2% increase in the secondary 
school net enrolment rates of the non-poor. The magnitude of the coefficients is 
small. Fixed effects estimates even show no significant impact. Hence, we do not 
find strong evidence that the district’s public spending on education has any impact 
on secondary school enrolment rates.  
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Table 3.5 Net enrolment rates for the poor and non-poor – OLS, FE, IV 
 OLS Fixed effects IV 
Poor Non-poor Poor Non-poor Poor Non-poor 
Natural logarithm of the real GRDP per capita 
0.0372*** 0.0225*** 0.0121 0.0144 0.0165 -0.0526** 
(0.0057) (0.00523) (0.013) (0.011) (0.0302) (0.0229) 
Natural logarithm of the district's educational spending per 
school aged child 
0.0135** 0.0106*** -8.79E-05 0.000996 -0.0217 0.159*** 
(0.00522) (0.00336) (0.0046) (0.00258) (0.061) (0.0461) 
Share of urban population 
-0.111*** -0.00631 -0.0591 0.0186 -0.1 0.0797 
(0.0233) (0.017) (0.0537) (0.0325) (0.071) (0.0537) 
Share of poor population 
0.396*** 0.176*** 0.219*** 0.015 0.101 -0.173** 
(0.0448) (0.036) (0.0634) (0.0394) (0.109) (0.0821) 
Share of female population 
-0.0428 -0.273* 0.04 -0.0605 0.0643 -0.285 
(0.196) (0.141) (0.214) (0.0926) (0.245) (0.186) 
Average age population 
0.0174*** 0.0213*** 0.000749 -0.00126 0.00576 7.65E-05 
(0.00277) (0.00196) (0.00432) (0.00262) (0.0052) (0.00394) 
Average household size 
-0.013 0.0195* -0.0135 0.0212** 0.0062 0.00688 
(0.0133) (0.0103) (0.0145) (0.00942) (0.0172) (0.013) 
Share of school aged children 
1.147*** 0.923*** 0.437** 0.370*** 0.166 0.909*** 
(0.201) (0.136) (0.182) (0.124) (0.304) (0.23) 
Average educational attainment  
0.115*** 0.0815*** 0.0794*** 0.0674*** 0.0742*** 0.0571*** 
(0.00638) (0.00519) (0.0103) (0.00654) (0.0123) (0.00927) 
Constant 
-1.776*** -1.223*** -0.371 -0.204 
(0.184) (0.136) (0.303) (0.211) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 2,786 2,787 2,786 2,787 2,136 2,136 
R-squared 0.475 0.652 0.667 0.838 
Number of district 414 414 364 364 
Notes: Clustered standard errors are in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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We similarly estimate the coefficients for the second dependent variable: transition 
rates to secondary school (Table 3.6). The OLS estimates show that the effect of a 
district’s public spending is insignificant for the non-poor and positive and 
significant for the poor, but in small magnitude. While the fixed effects and the IV 
estimates show that the coefficients of district’s public spending on education are not 
significantly different from zero. We find no difference between the impact of a 
district’s public education spending on the poor and the non-poor. Although the 
coefficients are higher when we look at regression on educational outcomes for the 
poor, they are not significant. Therefore, the absence of the positive impact of the 
district’s public education spending on educational outcomes is consistent across 
income distributions. 
 
Furthermore, we perform an estimation using the first and second lagged value of the 
district’s public education spending, instead of on its current value. The results are 
similarly consistent with our previous results, when we use the current value of the 
district’s public education spending. We found that the coefficient of the district’s 
public education spending is positive and significant, but only for the non-poor when 
we apply the IV method. Nonetheless, the magnitude of the coefficient is very small. 
The estimation results can be found in the appendix (Tables A.5 & Table A.7). 
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Table 3.6 Transition rates for the poor and non-poor – OLS, Fixed effects, IV 
OLS Fixed effects IV 
Poor Non-poor Poor Non-poor Poor Non-poor 
Ln (real GRDP per capita) 
0.00745 0.00376 -0.00298 0.00511 -0.0316 -0.00851 
(0.00515) (0.00456) (0.0114) (0.0055) (0.0224) (0.00976) 
Ln (district's educational spending per school aged child) 
0.0126*** 0.0052 0.00202 -0.000195 0.049 0.0236 
(0.00387) (0.00327) (0.00302) (0.00173) (0.0452) (0.0197) 
Share of urban population 
0.0127 0.115*** 0.0213 0.121*** 0.0734 0.125*** 
(0.0208) (0.0165) (0.0486) (0.0225) (0.0526) (0.0229) 
Share of poor population 
0.162*** 0.0818** 0.213*** 0.0692*** 0.074 0.00106 
(0.0462) (0.041) (0.0462) (0.0223) (0.0805) (0.035) 
Share of female population 
0.186 0.506*** 0.165 0.147** 0.405** 0.174** 
(0.164) (0.124) (0.15) (0.0681) (0.182) (0.0792) 
Average age of population 0.00662*** 0.00111 -0.00219 -0.0115*** 0.00163 -0.0112*** 
(0.00246) (0.00185) (0.00324) (0.00165) (0.00386) (0.00168) 
Average household size 0.0509*** 0.0547*** 0.0148 0.0204*** 0.000513 0.0127** 
(0.0133) (0.011) (0.0108) (0.00537) (0.0127) (0.00554) 
Share of school aged children 
-0.0128 -0.182 -0.579*** -0.362*** -0.378* -0.274*** 
(0.197) (0.146) (0.155) (0.0621) (0.225) (0.0981) 
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Average Educational attainment  
0.0845*** 0.0622*** 0.0602*** 0.0660*** 0.0582*** 0.0660*** 
(0.00641) (0.00502) (0.0106) (0.00427) (0.00909) (0.00396) 
-0.849*** -0.403*** 0.0897 0.347*** 
(0.159) (0.132) (0.208) (0.113) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummies Yes 
Observations 2,786 2,787 2,786 2,787 2,136 2,136 
R-squared 0.56 0.75 0.77 0.94 
Number of district 414 414 364 364 
Notes: Clustered standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3.7 shows the estimation results for the school supply analysis. We run the 
regression on the subsample for years 2003, 2006, 2008, and 2011, when the school 
supply data at the village level is available. In this particular analysis, several village 
characteristics are included in the regressors. The village level data from Podes are 
then aggregated up to district level and merged with the regional budget data and the 
socio-economic data from Susenas. As in the previous analysis, the current value of 
district’s public spending, its first, and second lagged values are examined for 
robustness check. From the three methods used in the regression (OLS, fixed effects, 
and IV), only OLS that shows positive and significant impact of the district’s public 
education spending on the number of junior secondary school. On the other hand, the 
estimation results from fixed effects and IV do not show significant coefficient. 
Hence, we do not find convincing results that district public spending has a role in 
improving schools. 
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Table 3.7 Number of junior secondary schools – OLS, Fixed effects, and IV 
Dependent variable: Number of junior secondary schools per 1000 junior-
secondary aged children OLS Fixed effects IV 
Ln (real GRDP per capita) 0.270*** 0.339*** 0.724*** 0.693*** 0.845** 1.808*** 
(0.0737) (0.0774) (0.237) (0.208) (0.374) (0.335) 
Lagged (1) Ln (district's educational spending per school aged child) 0.273*** 0.0939 -0.459 
(0.0992) (0.0947) (0.501) 
Lagged (2) Ln (district's educational spending per school aged child) 0.186*** -0.0121 0.684 
(0.0682) (0.0576) (0.558) 
Share of urban population -0.785** -0.935*** -0.459 -1.503* 0.589 1.617* 
(0.305) (0.33) (0.921) (0.804) (1.229) (0.924) 
Share of poor population 0.616 0.647 1.091 2.506* 0.819 0.703 
(0.697) (0.739) (1.721) (1.517) (1.174) (0.982) 
Share of female population 1.531 2.183 2.584 1.871 6.736 0.294 
(2.547) (2.634) (3.002) (2.439) (4.955) (4.234) 
Average age of population -0.0296 -0.0558 -0.00462 -0.0687 -0.171** -0.131* 
(0.0386) (0.0388) (0.0703) (0.0577) (0.0855) (0.0673) 
Average household size -0.279 -0.345* 0.325 0.657* 
(0.174) (0.18) (0.449) (0.358) 
Share of school aged children -9.437*** -10.92*** -15.24*** -16.71*** -20.57*** -17.44*** 
(2.431) (2.593) (3.525) (3.17) (3.963) (3.451) 
Average Educational attainment  0.128 0.106 -0.127 -0.117 0.34 0.21 
(0.0793) (0.0809) (0.159) (0.146) (0.211) (0.169) 
Share of villages with flat topography 0.197 -0.0472 0.125 -0.193 1.341*** 0.865** 
(0.199) (0.204) (0.327) (0.309) (0.458) (0.407) 
Share of villages with proper and accessible main road -0.747*** -0.566** -0.434 -0.454 1.470* 1.196 
(0.245) (0.252) (0.483) (0.479) (0.8) (0.78) 
Share of villages experienced disaster 0.263 0.295 0.276 0.277 0.497 0.972*** 
(0.203) (0.208) (0.234) (0.191) (0.345) (0.326) 
     (Continued) 
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(Continued) 
Intercept 
-1.347 0.199 -7.813* -4.111 
(2.423) (2.52) (4.697) (3.905) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummies Yes 
Observations 877 913 877 913 503 766 
R-squared 0.36 0.33 0.80 0.83 
Number of district 366 368 201 302 
Notes: Clustered standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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3.8. Conclusions 
This paper provides evidence about the impact of public spending on the educational 
sector under the decentralization era in Indonesia.  One of the main expected 
outcomes from the decentralization reform is improved public service delivery, 
including education. As the literature suggests, this could be accomplished through 
more effective public spending that is allocated and managed by local governments.  
This paper analyzes the extent to which decentralized public spending in Indonesia is 
translated into outcomes in the educational sector. The analysis illustrates that after a 
decade of implementation of decentralization in Indonesia, decentralized public 
education spending has no significant impact on educational outcomes, especially for 
the poor. For the non-poor, the impacts are positive and statistically significant, but 
in small magnitudes. In other specifications, the results for the non-poor are not even 
statistically significantly different from zero. Hence, the results cannot derive strong 
conclusions that decentralized public spending has any impact on educational 
outcomes. These results hold for three educational outcomes measured in the 
analysis: net enrolment rates for secondary school, transition rates to secondary 
school, and number of junior high school per 1000 junior-secondary aged children. 
The results suggest that improving the quality of spending is necessary. As 
mentioned in the previous section, there is currently no review or monitoring system 
of the local government’s actual expenditures and activities. This unfavorable 
condition is partly due to the weak link between the source of revenue and the 
purpose of expenditures at the district level (Green, 2005). Therefore, the absence of 
a monitoring system may become a big threat of budget accountability and the 
transparency mechanism.	
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Chapter 4. Cash Transfer, In-Kind, or Both?Assessing the Food and 
Nutrition Security Impacts of Social Protection Programs in 
Indonesia 
 
 
4.1. Background 
Despite the tremendous progress in decreasing poverty rates in the past decades, 17% 
of people in the developing world lives at or below the international poverty line of 
$1.25 a day. The governments of many developing countries have implemented a 
range of social protection programs as part of their broader poverty reduction 
strategies to help poor and vulnerable households confront the risk to their livelihood 
and maintain adequate access to food and other basic needs. Although the capacities 
to design and implement social protection policies have become more widespread 
over the past two decades (von Braun et al., 2009), their impacts in improving real 
outcomes are still in question. Some programs are crucial for the poor, but others 
may be redundant of other programs. Many researchers have studied the impact of a 
social protection programs (Ahmed et al., 2002; Schultz, 2004); however, to the best 
of my knowledge, none has examined the joint effect/synergy between programs. 
This paper aims to fill this gap by investigating the synergy impacts of social 
protection programs in Indonesia, specifically on food and nutrition security 
outcomes. 
Indonesia has four main active social protection programs: in-kind 
transfer/subsidized rice program (Raskin/Beras untuk Rakyat Miskin), conditional 
cash transfer (CCT) – also known as PKH (Program Keluarga Harapan), health fee 
waiver/health insurance for the poor (Jamkesmas/Jaminan Kesehatan Masyarakat, 
previously Askeskin/Asuransi Kesehatan Masyarakat Miskin), and scholarships in 
the form of cash transfers for poor students (BSM/Beasiswa Siswa Miskin). The 
eligibility criteria are often similar from one program to another. Consequently, these 
programs may have overlapping or joint effects if they are delivered to the same 
household and implemented at the same time. This paper attempts to evaluate the 
synergy impacts between CCT and Raskin. 
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Several motivations explain why this paper focuses on these two programs and not 
on the other two. First, CCT and Raskin have a similar main objective – improving 
household access to food by either delivering cash or subsidizing the price of main 
staple foods to increase buying power. However, they have different mechanisms. 
CCT delivers cash transfers to its recipients, who are obliged to fulfill specific health 
and education conditions (e.g., routine checkups for pregnant women and infants, 
school attendance for school-aged children). On the other hand, Raskin provides rice 
(an Indonesian staple food) at highly subsidized prices. Note that CCT has other 
important goals in the health and education sectors, while Raskin focuses on 
improving food security. The other two programs – scholarship and health fee waiver 
– have different and specific objectives on education and health, respectively. The 
scholarship program intends to help the poor overcome high education expenditures 
by providing cash transfers for eligible primary and high school students. The health 
fee waiver program aims to provide health insurance for the poor in the form of a fee 
waiver for preventive and curative health care services. 
 
The second motivation for focusing on CCT and Raskin is their unique 
characteristics. The heterogeneity characteristics of these programs make analysis of 
their synergy interesting. CCT has the smallest coverage as well as the smallest 
government budget among all the major social protection programs. CCT was 
launched in 2007 as a pilot program and benefited about 400,000 households. An 
impact evaluation design has been incorporated into the program. Participation in the 
program has been randomized at the sub-district level. Although the program’s 
coverage is still small and program implementation is far from perfect (Febriany et 
al., 2011), CCT has had a positive impact on households’ welfare and health 
outcomes (World Bank, 2011). On the other hand, Raskin is the oldest social 
protection program in Indonesia. It was originally launched in 1998 in response to 
the Asian financial crisis. Raskin is also the largest of these programs as it covers 
about half the population and accounts for more than half of the total government 
budget for social programs (Ministry of Finance, 2013). However, Raskin is 
associated with numerous implementation issues, which has made it ineffective in 
addressing the problems of poor households (Hastuti et al., 2008).  
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Addressing the consumption risk of the poor is a main objective of both CCT and 
Raskin. Poor Indonesians, like many others in developing countries, spend more than 
half of their income on food (von Braun and Tadesse, 2012). Poor consumers who 
cannot maintain their consumption stability reduce their food and nutrition intake as 
part of their survival strategy. In turn, a reduction in food and nutrition intake can 
have both short- and long-term effects (Block et al., 2004). Food and nutrition 
security (FNS) has long been a main concern in the international development 
agenda. The World Food Summit of 1996 highlighted the multidimensionality of 
food security: Food security exists when all people at all times have physical and 
economic access to sufficient, safe, and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs 
and food preferences for an active and healthy life (FAO, 2000). This concept is 
reflected in the four pillars of food security: availability, accessibility, utilization, and 
stability. The FNS indicator examined in this paper is the diet diversity score (DDS; 
Ruel, 2003), which represents the performance of food utilization. Indonesia has high 
risk in the indicator of diet diversification. Its score is only half the average score of 
all countries analyzed in the Global Food Security Index 2015 (Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2015). This is mostly because of rice dominating households’ 
calorie intake (Ariani, 2004; Suryana, 2014). The government of Indonesia is aware 
of this problem and has implemented several programs to address the issue. For 
example, the Ministry of Agriculture has led a national campaign of ‘One Day No 
Rice’ with the objective of promoting food diversification and helping to change 
people’s mind-set to reduce rice consumption by 1.5% annually.11 Social protection 
programs that aim to address food insecurity are also part of the strategy. Therefore, 
it is important to understand the effectiveness of social protection programs in 
improving food and nutrition security indicators such as the DDS. 
 
This paper attempts to evaluate the impacts of CCT and Raskin in improving the 
DDS as one of the food and nutrition security outcomes. Apart from its important 
contribution to the limited literature on food diversification in Indonesia, this paper 
attempts to understand the extent to which social protection programs, specifically 
																																																													
11  Source: http://jakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/archive/one-day-no-rice-to-become-national-program/ 
accessed in August 2015. The ‘One Day No Rice’ campaign was originally proposed by the local 
government of Depok (Mayor’s Decree No. 010/27-um in February 2012). Other local governments 
such as the provinces of South Sulawesi, North Sumatera, Bali, Samarinda, and Jayapura followed in 
implementing this campaign. Finally, in June 2012, the ‘One Day No Rice’ became a national 
campaign. 
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CCT and Raskin, help to increase households’ food security, especially in the food 
utilization aspect. The next two sections present a general review of the literature 
related to CCT and in-kind transfer. Section 4.4 describes the data used in the 
analysis and provides descriptive statistics of the main variables. Section 4.5 
discusses the methods used to perform the joint evaluation of multiple treatments of 
social protection programs. Section 4.5 presents estimation results and the last 
section concludes the chapter. 
 
4.2. Conditional Cash Transfer 
CCTs have become popular in developing countries over the last decade, and they 
have been studied across the globe in low- and middle-income countries. The CCT is 
a safety net program that transfers cash to poor households with several conditions 
on education- and health-promoting behavior. These conditions may include periodic 
check-ups for pregnant women, growth monitoring and vaccinations for infants, 
enrollment and school attendance for school-aged children, and demonstration of 
educational performance, such as through standardized test scores.  
CCTs aim to reduce poverty and break the intergenerational cycle of poverty through 
development of human capital. The cash component from a CCT is expected to raise 
households’ consumption level and therefore lift up their life from poverty. 
Furthermore, the education- and health-promoting behaviors resulting from CCT 
may have long-term impacts on participants’ employment and earning prospects 
(Fiszbein and Schady, 2009).  
The pioneer of CCTs is Brazil’s Bolsa Familia program and Mexico’s 
Opportunidades program. Both were launched in 1997 and now have covered 
millions of poor households (Lindert et al., 2007; Levy, 2006).  CCTs have now been 
implemented in more than 30 countries worldwide (Fiszbein and Schady, 2009). 
Various reports and journal articles have been produced analyzing the impact of 
these programs. Generally, CCT programs have a positive impact, including 
increased consumption levels among the poor (Fiszbein and Schady, 2009), 
increased school enrollment (see Khandker et. al. (2003) for Bangladesh, Maluccio 
and Flores (2005) for Nicaragua, Galasso (2006) for Chile, and Chaudhury and 
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Parajuli (2008) for Pakistan), increased utilization rates of health care providers (see 
Morris et al. (2004) for Honduras, Attanasio (2005) for Colombia, and Levy and 
Ohls (2007) for Jamaica), and improvement in children’s health and nutrition 
outcomes (Duflo, 2003; Attanasio et al., 2005; Paxson and Schady, 2008). However, 
the evidence is mixed on the final outcomes in health and education, such as 
educational achievement through standardized cognitive test scores (Paxson and 
Schady, 2008; Macours et al., 2008) or child height and/or weight for age (IFPRI, 
2003; Behrman and Hodinott, 2005; Attanasio et al., 2005). 
Many have debated whether “to condition or not to condition” the cash transfer 
program. De Brauw and Hodinott (2011) show that some beneficiaries did not 
receive the form needed to monitor the attendance of their children at school. They 
use several methods, including nearest neighbor matching and household fixed effect 
regressions, and show that the absence of this form reduces the likelihood of children 
attending school. The likelihood is even more severely reduced when children make 
the transition to lower secondary school. Their findings are consistent with the 
broader argument of De Janvry and Sadoulet (2006) that CCTs can achieve 
considerable efficiency gains through a more careful design by, for example, 
improving targeting among poor households and focusing on children who have a 
high probability of not enrolling in school without a conditional cash transfer and 
who have a high response to the amount offered.  
Most CCTs deliver the cash directly to the mother, including CCTs in Indonesia. 
One reason behind this is that mothers are more likely to allocate more resources to 
food and children’s health and education when they have greater control over 
resources (Hoddinott and Haddad, 1995; Duflo, 2003; Doss, 2006; Schady and 
Rosero, 2008). Contradictory evidence from Indonesia reveals that the increase in 
women’s access to an additional resource from CCT does not immediately raise their 
bargaining position in the household or against the husband because the use of most 
of this money remains in the corridor of routine household needs that have 
traditionally been the responsibility of women (Arif et al., 2011). Another qualitative 
study reports that CCTs’ contribution to the improvement in service utilization was 
observed only in one of two provinces; improvements were indicated by the increase 
in mothers’ attendance at posyandu (integrated health service posts) and students’ 
attendance in class (Febriany et al., 2011). 
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CCT in the Indonesian context was launched in 2007 as a pilot program. As in other 
countries, this program aims to improve the economy of the poor, increase access 
and utilization of health services for pregnant women, infants, and toddlers, and 
increase enrollment and attendance rates for school-aged children. In its inaugural 
year, the program delivered cash transfers of varying amounts depending on 
household characteristics (see Table 4.1) to more than 432,000 households in seven 
provinces. The program expanded its coverage to more than 1.4 million households 
in 2012. The eligibility criteria to receive the cash transfer are being a very poor 
household 12  with children aged 15 or younger and/or lactating and/or pregnant 
women.  
Table 4.1 CCT benefit (in IDR, per year) 
Fixed amount 200,000 
Cash amount for household with:  
Pregnant or lactating mother 800,000 
Infant/child age younger than 6 years 800,000 
Children of primary-school age 400,000 
Children of secondary-school age 800,000 
Source: Program’s guideline, Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA). Note: Minimum and maximum 
transfers per household are 600,000 and 2,200,000, respectively. 
 
CCT program implementation was conjugated with an impact evaluation design 
through randomization at the sub-district level. This allowed the impact evaluation of 
CCT by comparing the outcomes of sub-districts in the treatment group and control 
group. The baseline and follow-up surveys were conducted in 2007 and 2009, 
respectively. CCT was implemented immediately after the baseline survey as a 
government pilot program in seven provinces: West Java, East Java, North Sulawesi, 
Gorontalo, East Nusa Tenggara, West Sumatra, and Jakarta. These provinces were 
selected to represent Indonesia’s geographic and socio-economic heterogeneity (e.g., 
high/medium/low poverty rates, urban/rural areas, coastal/islands, 
accessible/difficult-to-access areas; Sparrow et al., 2008). Within each province, the 
																																																													
12 Poverty lines are defined by the BPS (Biro Pusat Statistik/Statistics Indonesia).  
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districts were ranked based on district poverty rates, incidence of malnutrition, and 
transition rates from primary to secondary schooling. The richest 20% of districts 
was excluded (World Bank, 2011). CCT-eligible districts were then taken from the 
remaining pool of districts implementing the community empowerment program. 
Sub-districts that have sufficient health and education facilities were eligible to 
participate in the CCT pilot program. From a total of 588 eligible sub-districts, 259 
were randomly selected to CCT treatment groups. The remaining 329 sub-districts 
were kept as control groups. 
 
After having treatment and control sub-districts, CCT targeted beneficiaries were 
identified using a list of poor and extremely poor households that were surveyed by 
Statistics Indonesia in 2005. This survey was originally intended to screen eligible 
beneficiaries for the unconditional cash transfer program that was implemented in 
2005 as an emergency response to the fuel subsidy reduction. From this list with an 
additional group of eligible households that were excluded, Statistics Indonesia used 
health and education survey data to demographically identify eligible households that 
met CCT criteria: households with pregnant and/or lactating women and/or with 
children aged 0-15 years and/or with children aged 16-18 years who have not yet 
completed 9 years of basic education. The list of CCT-eligible households was then 
reviewed by the implementing agency, the Ministry of Social Affairs. Ultimately, 
approximately 430,000 beneficiary households were identified through this selection 
process. 
The World Bank (2011) has utilized the baseline and follow-up survey data to 
evaluate the impacts of CCT and found that Indonesian CCT recipients experienced a 
10% increase in their average monthly consumption. The number of children age < 5 
weighed in health facilities was also higher (15–22 percentage points) in CCT areas. 
However, the impact on education outcomes (e.g., enrollment and drop-out rates) is 
not significantly different from zero.   
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4.3. In-kind transfer 
In-kind transfer programs provide additional resources to households by making 
resources in the form of food, school-related resources (e.g., uniforms, books), or 
health-related resources (e.g., medicines, medical equipment) available when needed 
the most. The usual in-kind transfer is a food transfer in the form of food rations, 
school feeding program, and supplementary or emergency food distribution. 
In-kind transfer has been used since ancient Egypt and the Roman Empire flourished. 
More recent food-based transfers can be found in South Asia after the 1944 Bengal 
famine (Grosh et al., 2008). Many similar programs have been implemented in 
Ethiopia (Adams and Kebede, 2005; del Ninno et al., 2005), Bangladesh (Ahmed, 
2005; del Ninno and Dorosh, 2003), the Philippines (Economics and Social 
Commission for Asia and the Pacific, 2001), and Indonesia (Yonekura, 2005; 
Timmer, 2004). Food-based transfers generally aim to reduce a household’s 
uncertainty with respect to acquiring a minimum amount of food staples (Pinstrup-
Andersen, 1988). Food subsidy programs, another well-known type of food-based 
program in developing countries, can serve as an additional source of income for its 
recipients. These income transfers strengthen the purchasing power of poor 
households (Pinstrup-Andersen and Alderman, 1988; von Braun, 1988).  
In-kind transfer in Indonesia is also known as a food subsidy program called Raskin 
(Rice for the Poor). This program was originally launched to strengthen food security 
of poor households in response to the Asian financial crisis in 1998. However, since 
2002, the objective has been to expand not only as an emergency response but also as 
one of the social protection programs. Raskin provides rice at a subsidized price. In 
2010, the subsidized price was IDR 1,600/kg, around 18% of the average market 
price of rice in the same year. General guidelines for the Raskin program state that 
each eligible household is entitled to purchase 14 kg/month of Raskin rice. This 
makes the value of the annual benefit per household about IDR 1.2 million. 
However, many implementation issues have caused the de facto average of Raskin 
rice purchased by each household to be only 4 kg/month (World Bank, 2012b). 
The Raskin program encounters many problems in the distribution of rice from the 
primary distribution point to the beneficiaries. The program lacks socialization and 
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targeting accuracy (Hastuti et al., 2008). Apart from the rice distribution issue, 
Raskin rice is often of low quality and/or unacceptable quality (Isdijoso et al., 2011). 
In some areas, Raskin rice is divided equally among recipients to avoid conflicts and 
social jealousy (Tabor and Sawit, 2011). Despite the various implementation issues, 
Raskin had a positive impact on expenditures for higher nutrient food (i.e., meat, 
fish, and dairy products). The impact on adult goods expenditures was higher than 
for expenditures of higher nutrient food (Pangaribowo, 2012). 
 
4.4. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
This study use panel data from a baseline survey that was fielded in June-August 
2007 (before CCT implementation) and a follow-up survey in 2009 (approximately 
26-30 months after CCT implementation). The baseline and follow-up surveys were 
conducted in 180 treatment and 180 control sub-districts that were randomly selected 
from the list of randomly assigned treatment and control sub-districts, respectively. 
Within sub-districts, eight villages were randomly selected to be surveyed. Within 
villages, two households were randomly selected from eligible households with a 
pregnant/lactating mother and three from eligible households with children 0-15 
years old.13 The follow-up survey was conducted with the same households and 
individuals in the baseline, with an attrition rate of approximately 2.5% (World 
Bank, 2011). 
Both baseline and follow-up surveys collected household information on 
socioeconomic and demographic characteristics as well as schooling, health, and 
nutrition outcomes for mothers and infants/children. Questions regarding recipient 
status for each social protection program, including CCT and Raskin, were also 
asked in the surveys. Furthermore, a question regarding the last time a household 
received Raskin was also recorded in both baseline and follow-up surveys. This 
information helps us categorize which households received both Raskin and CCT at 
about the same time ‒ between the baseline and follow-up surveys ‒ that is relevant 
for our analysis. 
																																																													
13 Eligibility criteria are defined by Statistics Indonesia and include housing characteristics, education  
attainment levels, fuel sources, assets, access to a source of lighting, clean water, education, and 
health services, and type of employment. 
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The impact of the CCT and Raskin programs measured in this paper is one aspect of 
the FNS indicators that can be analyzed at the household level – the DDS – that 
represents food utilization. DDS is defined as the number of different foods or food 
groups consumed by the household over the past month. A list of food groups for 
DDS measures is shown in Appendix Table A.8.   
In this study, we perform two sets of multiple-treatment analyses. The first set looks 
at the impacts of programs for households that had not received Raskin before the 
baseline (hereafter period 1). In other words, the analysis shows the impacts for 
households that did not receive aid from any program (CCT or Raskin) in period 1 
because CCT was implemented only after the baseline (hereafter period 2). We 
create a categorical variable of four types of household (see Table 4.2) with the 
following: 
- Group 0: Consists of households that did not receive benefits from any program 
(CCT or Raskin) in period 2 
- Group 1: Consists of households that received only CCT in period 2 
- Group 2: Consists of households that received only Raskin in period 2 
- Group 3: Consists of households that received both CCT and Raskin in period 2 
Table 4.2 Treatment category for non-Raskin recipient in period 1 
Treatment Category Period 1 Period 2 
Group 0 
Raskin: x 
CCT:    x 
Raskin: x 
CCT:    x 
Group 1 
Raskin: x 
CCT:    √ 
Group 2 
Raskin: √ 
CCT:    x 
Group 3 
Raskin: √ 
CCT:    √ 
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In this analysis, the control group is group 0, the households that never received any 
program benefits (CCT or Raskin) in period 1 and period 2. The impact on group 1 
and group 2 estimate the impact of receiving CCT and Raskin, respectively, while 
the impact on group 3 is the estimated impact of receiving both CCT and Raskin at 
the same time (in period 2). 
The second set of analyses looks at households that had received Raskin in period 1 
(existing Raskin recipients). As explained in the previous section, Raskin was 
implemented in 1998, long before CCT was launched. About 50% of population had 
been receiving Raskin before the baseline survey was conducted. Therefore, it is 
important to look at this group of households separately. We create a categorical 
variable for this analysis, as follows (Table 4.3): 
- Group 4: Consists of households that did not receive any program benefits in 
period 2  
- Group 5: Consists of households that received only CCT in period 2 
- Group 6: Consists of households that received only Raskin in period 2 
- Group 7: Consists of households that received both CCT and Raskin in period 2 
Table 4.3 Treatment category for Raskin recipients in period 1 
Treatment Category Period 1 Period 2 
Group 4 
Raskin: √ 
CCT:    x 
Raskin: x 
CCT:    x 
Group 5 
Raskin: x 
CCT:    √ 
Group 6 
Raskin: √ 
CCT:    x 
Group 7 
Raskin: √ 
CCT:    √ 
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With the treatment category shown in Table 4.3, we could estimate the incremental 
benefit of CCT on the existing Raskin recipients. This incremental benefit of CCT 
can be divided into two types: (1) incremental benefit of CCT on existing Raskin 
recipients who continued to receive Raskin in period 2 (estimated using treatment 
group 7) and (2) incremental benefit of CCT on existing Raskin recipients who no 
longer received Raskin in period 2 (estimated using treatment group 5). Treatment 
group 6 is used to estimate the impact of Raskin on households that previously 
received Raskin. In other words, treatment group 6 would estimate the impact of 
continuing to receive Raskin, while treatment 4 serves as the control group. 
 
Table 4.4 shows the means of selected household characteristics for each treatment 
group. As mentioned earlier, the baseline and follow-up surveys were designed to 
include a random sample of CCT-eligible households. This means that all 
respondents came from very poor households and satisfied CCT eligibility criteria 
which can be seen in Table 4.4. 
 
 
89	
	
Table 4.4 Summary statistics of each treatment group 
 Analysis 1 to the non-recipients Analysis 2 to the existing Raskin recipients 
Treatment group 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Household size 5.208 5.281 5.180 5.103 5.139 5.213 5.191 5.201
Age of household head 39.833 38.306 40.631 40.511 40.320 41.541 41.967 42.338
Female-headed household  0.030 0.035 0.069 0.075 0.103 0.070 0.094 0.080
Household head works in agriculture 0.525 0.667 0.597 0.701 0.660 0.591 0.691 0.656
Education of household head 2.424 2.000 2.090 2.019 1.820 2.095 1.842 1.922
SLT/BLT recipient  0.750 0.842 0.812 0.897 0.974 0.903 0.956 0.939
Askeskin recipient 0.203 0.368 0.326 0.318 0.474 0.386 0.532 0.497
Access to electricity 0.915 0.895 0.887 0.813 0.799 0.900 0.799 0.853
Access to a proper toilet 0.551 0.386 0.470 0.364 0.423 0.483 0.357 0.437
Access to clean water 0.788 0.912 0.800 0.757 0.778 0.832 0.739 0.784
Total number of assets 3.271 2.193 2.919 2.000 2.330 2.938 2.584 2.974
House is private/own property 0.720 0.596 0.791 0.757 0.804 0.812 0.880 0.888
Mother is pregnant 0.047 0.088 0.056 0.084 0.041 0.063 0.059 0.062
Proper roof 0.881 0.842 0.889 0.766 0.840 0.900 0.870 0.910
Proper floor 0.818 0.737 0.800 0.673 0.603 0.739 0.579 0.668
Proper sanitation 0.449 0.316 0.334 0.178 0.211 0.358 0.181 0.272
Proper walls 0.445 0.263 0.522 0.262 0.309 0.474 0.315 0.459
Main fuel of cooking is firewood 0.373 0.158 0.282 0.159 0.165 0.278 0.151 0.207
Per capita expenditure 2007  249,143  216,789  228,317  191,071  192,081  234,438  182,317  196,198 
Per capita expenditure 2009  312,421  244,398  257,283  240,735  253,770  275,732  234,625  243,872 
Per capita food expenditure 2007  164,701  155,036  140,916  137,977  130,991  145,062  125,419  131,790 
Per capita food expenditure 2009  184,211  174,825  167,011  162,564  166,916  166,946  152,041  154,407 
Number of observations  236  57  521  107  601  194  8,834  2,774 
Note: All figures are means of characteristics for each treatment group. BLT : Bantuan Langsung Tunai or Unconditional Cash Transfer. Askeskin is original name 
of the health fee waiver program for the poor. BLT and Askeskin are social protection programs that are also targeted to very poor and poor households.   
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Before calculating the impact of each treatment, we present the mean-comparison test (t-
test) of the difference of food and nutrition security outcomes between the treatment and 
control groups, capturing the period before and after intervention. Table 4.5 shows that 
treatments 2 and 3 had a significant different in DDS compared to the control group of 
non-Raskin recipients in period 1. 
Table 4.5 Difference in difference in DDS for non-Raskin recipients in period 1 
Treatment group DID in DDS 
1 vs 0 0.079 
 (0.193) 
2 vs 0 0.458***
 (0.095) 
3 vs 0 0.661***
0.103 
Author calculation based on the baseline and follow-up survey data 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
	
For Raskin recipients in period 1, all treatment groups had a significant different in DDS 
before and after the intervention (Table 4.6). 
Table 4.6 Difference in difference in DDS for Raskin recipients in period 1 
Treatment group DID in DDS 
5 vs 4 0.502***
 (0.193) 
6 vs 4 0.215***
 (0.095) 
7 vs 4 0.367***
0.103 
Author calculation based on the baseline and follow-up survey data 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
4.5. Estimation Strategy 
In estimating the impacts of a treatment, the main questions are whether an intervention 
has any impact (on measured outcomes) and how large the impact is given the resources 
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spent on the program. It is not easy to measure the real impact of a program because it is 
impossible to measure the counterfactual outcome, that is, what would have happened to 
the beneficiaries in the absence of a program. The impact evaluation problem has been 
defined by the standard model of Roy (1951) and Rubin (1974). It has been extended to 
the multiple treatment case by Imbens (2000) and Lechner (2001). Although there is less 
work in the multiple treatment literature, Imbens (2000) derives a generalization of 
propensity score and shows that the results by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) still hold 
for multiple treatments. After creating four different treatment groups for each set of 
analysis, as explained in the previous section, we employ the inverse probability 
weighting (IPW) method (Hirano et al., 2003) to study the treatment effect of multiple 
treatments. The underlying assumptions of IPW are (1) the conditional-independence 
assumption that restricts the dependence between the treatment model and the potential 
outcomes, (2) the overlap assumption that ensures that each individual’s probability of 
receiving any treatment level is greater than zero, and (3) the independent and 
identically distributed sampling assumption that ensures that the treatment status of each 
individual is independent of the potential outcomes and treatment statuses of other 
individuals in the population. To ensure that the assumption of conditional-independence 
holds, the dataset used should provide as many relevant variables as possible so that 
none of confounders of the treatment and outcome variable is left out. Our dataset 
records not only standard variables like family background and demographic 
characteristics, but also the proxy-mean-test variables that were used to identify eligible 
households. Thus, it is not too naïve to assume that this condition is not violated. 
Furthermore, the estimated densities have most of their masses in the same regions in 
which they overlap each other. This means that the overlap assumption holds. The plot 
of estimated densities of the probability of getting each treatment level is presented in 
Appendix Figure A.1.  
 
The empirical strategy of this chapter follows the basic setup based on Imbens (2000) 
and Lechner (2001). In the case of multiple treatments, the treatment of interest,	 ௜ܶ, takes 
integer values between 0 and J. The potential outcome for household i receiving 
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treatment t is denoted by ௜ܻ௧ . ௜ܺ  denotes the vector of household characteristics for 
household i. ܦ௜௧ሺ ௜ܶሻ is the indicator of receiving treatment t  for household i: 
ܦ௜௧ሺ ௜ܶሻ ൌ ൜1, ݂݅			 ௜ܶ ൌ ݐ	0,								݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁ 
Imbens (2000) defines the generalized propensity score as the conditional probability of 
receiving a treatment given the pre-treatment variables: 
ݎሺݐ, ݔሻ ≡ Pr	ሾ ௜ܶ ൌ ݐ| ௜ܺ ൌ ݔሿ=E[ܦ௜௧ሺ ௜ܶሻ| ௜ܺ ൌ ݔ] 
In the binary treatment case, the unconditional means of the potential outcomes can be 
identified by weighting: 
ܧ ቈ ௜ܻܦ௜௧ሺ ௜ܶሻݎሺݐ, ௜ܺሻ ቉ ൌ ܧሾ ௜ܻ௧ሿ 
Based on this identification results and assuming the conditional-independence and 
overlap assumptions are satisfied as in the binary treatment case, one can expand the 
treatment effect estimator for a multiple treatment case as follows: 
- the average effect of treatment m relative to treatment l: 
ߩො௠௟ ൌ 1ܰ෍
௜ܻܦ௜௠ሺ ௜ܶሻ
̂ݎሺ݉, ௜ܺሻ
ே
௜ୀଵ
െ 1ܰ෍
௜ܻܦ௜௟ሺ ௜ܶሻ
̂ݎሺ݈, ௜ܺሻ
ே
௜ୀଵ
 
-the average effect of treatment m relative to treatment l for an individual randomly 
drawn from the population of households receiving treatment m: 
ߪො௠௟|௠ ൌ 1ܰ௠෍ ௜ܻܦ௜௠ሺ ௜ܶሻ
ே
௜ୀଵ
െ 1ܰ௠෍ܦ௜௟ሺ ௜ܶሻ
ே
௜ୀଵ
௜ܻ
̂ݎሺ݉, ௜ܺሻ
̂ݎሺ݈, ௜ܺሻ  
Intuitively, IPW uses weighted means instead of simple unweighted means to 
disentangle the treatment effect and other covariates. The weights come from the inverse 
of the treatment group’s probability of being observed, which leads to an efficient 
estimate of the treatment effect (Hirano, Imbens, & Ridder, 2003). These probabilities 
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are obtained by fitting a model of treatment status on the subject’s characteristics using a 
multinomial logit (MNL) model.  
 
4.6. Discussion of the Results 
As mentioned earlier, eligibility criteria were generally similar among the social 
protection programs, including CCT and Raskin. However, it is important to note that 
CCT has a smaller target group since it only targets extremely poor households with 
pregnant mothers and/or infants and/or school-aged children. The multinomial logit was 
used to estimate the treatment status. Covariates involved in the analysis were mostly 
based on the relevant variables used in determining eligible households through the 
proxy-mean-test prepared by Statistics Indonesia. This included household welfare 
conditions and household head characteristics. The coefficients from the model used to 
predict each treatment status are presented in appendix Table A.9 & A.10. Both the 
average treatment effect (ATE) and the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) are 
estimated using the IPW method.  
4.6.1. The impacts of CCT and Raskin 
4.6.1.1 Treatment effects for non-Raskin recipients in period 1 
For the first set of analyses, we look at the group of households that did not receive any 
program aid in period 1. In each case, the control groups are the households that did not 
receive any program aid in the two periods (see Table 4.2 in the previous section). Table 
4.7 shows the estimate of ATE and ATT of CCT (treatment 1 – (1) vs (0)) are not 
significantly different from zero. Similarly, Raskin (treatment 2 – (2) vs (0)) is shown to 
have no significant impact on the DDS. Group of households in treatment category 3 
that received both CCT and Raskin in period 2 – labeled (3) vs (0) – do not have 
significant impact either. The results show no statistically significant impact (ATE or 
ATT) of any treatment category on the selected outcome. CCT, Raskin, or both show no 
impact on the entire population or on those who were treated. 
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Table 4.7 ATE and ATT in the DDS – non Raskin recipients in period 1 
  ATE ATT 
1 vs 0 -0.09 -0.57 
(0.386) (0.42) 
2 vs 0 0.25 -0.041 
(0.201) (0.34) 
3 vs 0 0.12 -0.079 
  (0.286) -0.44 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
We also look at the relative effects between single treatment and multiple treatments. 
Single treatment means receiving benefit only from one program (CCT only or Raskin 
only). While multiple treatment means receiving benefit from both CCT and Raskin. 
The relative effect estimates (Table 4.8) reveal that the impacts of going from treatment 
1 (receiving CCT only) to treatment 3 – (3) vs (1) are not significantly different from 
zero. Similarly, the impacts of going from treatment 2 (receiving Raskin only) to 
treatment 3 (receiving both CCT and Raskin) are not significantly different from zero.  
 
Table 4.8 Relative effects in the DDS - non-Raskin recipient in period 1 
  ATE ATT 
3 vs 1 0.21 0.12 
(0.41) (0.43) 
3 vs 2 0.12 -0.32 
  (0.25) (0.26) 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
We can see several possible reasons that may explain the results in Table 4.7 and Table 
4.8 above. First, the duration of evaluation (between the baseline survey in 2007 and the 
follow-up survey in 2009) may be too short to capture the possible impacts of CCT 
and/or Raskin on DDS with respect to the group of households that had not received any 
of these programs before the baseline survey. Two years may not be sufficient to change 
people’s mind-set to diversify their food consumption, especially for Indonesians who 
mostly eat rice at every meal as described in the beginning of this chapter. Second, more 
sufficient socialization may be needed before the program is implemented. Socialization 
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regarding the objective of the program and implementation, including how the funds or 
additional income from the program should and should not be used, may need to be an 
integrated activity in the program implementation. Many social protection programs are 
implemented with a lack of socialization on the program’s objective, targeted 
beneficiaries, benefit levels, and delivery mechanism (Grosh et al., 2008). This is also 
the case in Indonesia whose main social programs suffer from unreliable socialization 
and monitoring activities (Hastuti et al., 2008; Sumarto and Widyanti, 2008; Rosfadhila 
et al., 2009). Poor socialization could lead to communities receiving inconsistent 
information and affect program performance and acceptance (World Bank, 2012a). For 
example, evidence suggests the misuse of funds due to lack of socialization and 
monitoring on how the funds should or should not be used (Widjaja, 2013; Syukri et al., 
2010). Furthermore, the absence of monitoring how households use the funds from the 
program may also explain the results found in this study. 
Not many empirical studies have been conducted on the impact evaluation of social 
protection programs in Indonesia, especially for CCT and Raskin, that can be compared 
to the results of this study. The World Bank (2011) examined the impact of CCT and 
found that CCT increased the share of food expenditure on high-protein foods (meat, 
fish, eggs, dairy) by nearly three quarters of a percentage point. Pangaribowo (2012) 
similarly showed that Raskin enabled the poor to increase expenditures on nutritious 
food and health care. However, none of the previous studies has analyzed the impact of 
the programs on food diversification.  
  
4.6.1.2. Treatment effects for existing Raskin recipients  
 
In the second set of analyses, we look at the group of households that received Raskin in 
period 1. The control group (treatment 4) is the group of households that received 
Raskin in period 1 and did not receive any program aid in period 2. The results of (5 vs 
4) estimate the impact of CCT for households that previously received Raskin (and 
stopped receiving it in period 2), while (6 vs 4) estimates the impact of receiving Raskin 
in both periods. Also, the results of (7 vs 4) estimate the impact of receiving both CCT 
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and Raskin in the second period for households that were Raskin recipients in period 1 
(see Table 4.3 in the previous section). 
The estimated difference in DDS before and after the baseline (between period 1 and 2) 
for the control group is 0.38 (statistically significant at the 1% level). Thus, the results in 
Table 4.9 - (5 vs 4) - show that receiving CCT in the second period increased the 
difference by an average of 0.36 (ATE) versus an average of 0.38 for households that do 
not receive any program aid in the second period. For those who were treated, receiving 
CCT in the second period increased the difference in DDS by an average of 0.38 (ATT) 
or about 81% from the average of 0.47 for households that were not treated. 
 
Table 4.9 ATE and ATT in the DDS – existing Raskin recipients in period 1 
  ATE ATT 
5 vs 4 0.36* 0.38** 
(0.208) (0.197) 
6 vs 4 0.187* 0.13 
(0.109) (0.127) 
7 vs 4 0.25** 0.22* 
  (0.11) (0.134) 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
While the estimated ATE for receiving Raskin in both period (6 vs 4) is 0.18 or about 
half of the estimated ATE for receiving CCT. For those who treated with treatment 6, 
the program effect is not significantly different from zero. On the other hand, the 
estimated ATE of treatment 7 – receiving both CCT and Raskin in the second period – is 
0.25 and statistically significant at the 5% level. This impact is lower than the estimated 
results for treatment 5 (0.36). Compared to similar households that received Raskin in 
the first period, receiving only CCT in the second period had a more significant impact 
on the households than receiving both CCT and Raskin. One possible explanation is that 
households that received Raskin would assume that most of their calorie needs were 
fulfilled by consuming Raskin rice and therefore have less incentive to buy other kinds 
of foods. This is possible as Indonesians have a high dependency on rice; it is the main 
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staple food, accounting for more than two-thirds of their total cereal calorie intake.14 In 
Indonesia, most people eat rice three times a day, for breakfast, lunch, and dinner. The 
popular local saying goes ‘if you have not had rice, then you have not eaten.’  
   
This second part of the analysis also looks at the relative effects of ATE and ATT 
between single and multiple treatments (Table 4.10). The estimates reveal that the ATE 
and ATT of going from treatment 5 (receiving CCT only) to treatment 7 (receiving both 
CCT and Raskin) are not significantly different from zero (7 vs 5). On the other hand, 
the estimated ATE of going from treatment 6 (receiving Raskin only) to treatment 7 
(receiving both CCT and Raskin) is not significant (7 vs 6). While for those who are 
treated, the estimated difference in DDS increased by 0.1.  
 
 
Table 4.10 Relative effects in the DDS - existing Raskin recipients in period 1 
  ATE ATT 
7 vs 5 -0.1 -0.25 
(0.18) (0.20) 
7 vs 6 0.06 0.1* 
  (0.05) (0.06) 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
When we look specifically at households that received aid from both programs, we have 
two types of households. First is the group of households that started receiving CCT and 
Raskin at about the same time (in period 2). This group previously had not received any 
program aid and suddenly received aid from two programs (labelled treatment 3 in the 
first set of analysis). They have an insignificant impact on the measured outcome. A lack 
of socialization, as explained in the previous sub-section, is one possible explanation. 
This condition would be even worse for households that receive first-time benefits from 
more than one program simultaneously (as in the case of treatment 3).  
 
																																																													
14 Own estimation based on data from FAOSTAT. 
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Second, the group of households that received Raskin in period 1 and both Raskin and 
CCT in period 2 felt a positive and significant impact (labelled treatment 7 in the second 
set of analysis). This group of households may have enjoyed the benefit from Raskin 
before receiving CCT. The experience of becoming Raskin recipients may help 
households understand how the social protection works in improving their lives.  
 
These results suggest that it is important in policy evaluation to investigate the 
interaction between policies to determine whether the complementarities between CCT 
and Raskin are worth implementing or it is better to re-formulate these two overlapping 
policies. 
 
4.6.2. Cost-effectiveness of programs 
To see which program is more cost-effective, this study explored the government 
expenditures on each program.  Figure 4.1 shows that in 2012 Raskin accounted for 
nearly two-thirds of the total budget for all social protection programs, while CCT had 
about a 5% share.  
Figure 4.1 Central government 2012 budget 
 
Source: Financial Note and Indonesian Budget Fiscal Year 2013, Ministry of Finance. 
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One of the World Bank’s collections of public expenditure review estimates the public 
spending on CCT and Raskin in Indonesia (2012). The spending items include the 
amount of transfer and administration costs which mainly involve goods and services, 
including socialization, monitoring, and evaluation. We utilize these estimates and 
compare them to the impact of each program analyzed in this study (see Table 4.11).  
Table 4.11 Costs	and	Impacts	of	CCT	and	Raskin 
CCT In-kind (Raskin) 
Public expenditure (US $)1  132,000,000  1,749,000,000 
Number of recipients (households)1  778,000  18,500,000 
Public expenditure per recipient (US $)  169.67  94.54 
Impact on DDS for non-Raskin recipients2 0 0 
Impact on DDS for existing Raskin recipients 
in period 12 81% 0 
1) World Bank,2012,  2)Table 4.9 and Table 4.7  
Table 4.11 illustrates that, for existing Raskin recipients, it is more cost-effective to 
implement CCT than continue giving Raskin. Per US $100 spent on CCT, the estimated 
impacts on food utilization indicators increased by 48% for existing Raskin recipients. 
The same amount of money is estimated to have an insignificant impact if it is spent on 
Raskin. Note that CCT may have impacts on education and health outcomes as the 
program conditionality requires households to invest their resources and time in health 
and education. This study, however, does not provide a full cost/benefit analysis of CCT 
as it is beyond the scope of this paper. 
However, since no significant impact was found for households that did not receive 
Raskin in period 1, we cannot conclude which program is more cost-effective for this 
particular group. This would be of interest for further research when the required data 
with longer duration of assessment are available. This study’s analyses were performed 
using a baseline survey in 2007 and a follow-up survey in 2009. Two years may not be 
sufficient to capture the impact of the programs on food utilization indicators, especially 
because this requires changing people’s mind-set and behavior with respect to their food 
consumption. 
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4.8. Conclusions 
This study reports the results of the impact evaluations of CCT and Raskin on food and 
nutrition security outcomes. Two separate empirical models have been analyzed to 
understand the synergy impact between CCT and Raskin on food and nutrition security 
outcomes. The first analysis looks at households that had not received Raskin or CCT in 
period 1 (before the baseline survey was conducted) while the second set of analyses 
looks specifically at households that had received Raskin in period 1. In the first 
analysis, we find no significant impact of any treatment, while the results of the second 
analysis show a positive and significant average treatment effect on the treated, 
especially for households that received only CCT and households that received both 
CCT and Raskin in period 2. These results suggest that households that previously 
received Raskin may have become more familiar with the implementation of social 
protection programs and therefore may be better able to manage the additional resource 
of income provided by the program. The results also suggest that more sufficient 
socialization regarding the objective of the program, including how the funds or 
additional income from the program should and should not be used, may be needed. 
Program socialization may help households in understanding how the programs work to 
achieve the program’s objective and finally help them improve their live. 
On the other hand, the second set of analyses shows that the estimated impact of 
receiving only CCT was higher than for receiving both CCT and Raskin. These results 
suggest that providing both CCT and Raskin may not always yield better outcomes than 
providing only CCT. From the institutional perspective, it would be more effective to 
introduce one program with sufficient socialization, monitoring, and evaluation activities 
than to introduce two programs at the same time. Likewise, from the beneficiaries’ 
perspective, it would be easier for households to gradually manage the additional 
resource of income that comes from one program rather than face a rapid change in their 
financial situation due to receiving benefits from two programs at the same time. 
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This study points to the importance of further research to examine the impact of the 
programs on food and nutrition security indicators for households that did not receive 
benefits from any program (Raskin or CCT) in the first period since this study does not 
find convincing results using two years of data. In addition, although this study does not 
provide a complete cost/benefit analysis of social protection programs in Indonesia, it 
suggests to consider the importance of reformulating these overlapping policies, 
especially because Raskin consumes more than half of the social protection budget. 
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Chapter 5. General Conclusions  
 
Poverty has been one of the greatest problems that concern the world for decades. 
Although poverty is scattered across the globe, the related issues are more critical in 
developing countries. Indonesia is not an exception. Despite of being the world’s 10th 
largest economy in terms of purchasing power parity, 28.6 million Indonesians still live 
in poverty. As in many other developing countries, the government of Indonesia has 
stated poverty reduction strategies in its main National Agenda. Great amount of 
resources have been spent on reforms and programs aimed at reducing poverty. This 
dissertation discusses two strategies that are commonly used to tackle poverty, including 
in Indonesia: (1) provision of basic services and infrastructures and (2) social protection 
programs. 
This dissertation starts by analyzing the persistence of poverty in rural Indonesia, this 
study finds that the true state dependence of poverty is significant for the case of 
Indonesia. This means that a household’s current poverty status is a substantial element 
that can be used to determine the household’s future state of poverty. Therefore, the 
results suggest the importance of having the effective poverty reduction strategy, as it 
will help not only to reduce the current poverty rates but also to boost long-term growth. 
This study also reveals other correlates of poverty that are related to public services and 
community infrastructures in rural areas. Resides in a village with access to a paved 
main road, high school, and proper non-primitive irrigation system would be less likely 
to be in poverty. While residing in a village that has interruptions in pipe water services 
are positively associated with probability of being poor. The results suggest that poverty 
reduction strategy may consider public services and community infrastructures variables 
above, especially for the targeting method in determining eligible beneficiaries for social 
protection programs. The effective targeting method is essential in designing social 
protection system in a country. Therefore, in addition to the household characteristics 
that have been used in the current targeting method, it may also be beneficial to include 
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public services and community infrastructures variables that are found to play a role in 
determining household’s poverty status. 
In exploring the effectiveness of decentralized education public spending on education 
outcomes at secondary level, this research reveals that after a decade implementation of 
an important institutional reform - decentralization - in Indonesia, education public 
spending has very little impact on education outcomes. These negligible impacts are 
robust using different specifications and across income distribution. The results suggest 
the importance of improving quality of spending. The absence of review and monitoring 
system of local government actual expenditures and activities may be threatening 
transparency and budget accountability.  
On the other hand, some of micro interventions are found to have positive impacts for 
the poor. Social protection programs that are targeted to the poor, helps household in 
maintaining their food and nutrition security. These results suggest that households that 
previously received Raskin may have become more familiar with the implementation of 
social protection programs and therefore may be better able to manage the additional 
resource of income provided by the program. We found that providing both CCT and 
Raskin may not always yield better outcomes than providing only CCT. From the 
institutional perspective, it would be more effective to introduce one program with 
sufficient socialization, monitoring, and evaluation activities than to introduce two 
programs at the same time. Likewise, from the beneficiaries’ perspective, it would be 
easier for households to gradually manage the additional resource of income that comes 
from one program rather than face a rapid change in their financial situation due to 
receiving benefits from two programs at the same time.  
The findings of this study reaffirm the importance of public services and infrastructures 
as well as social protection programs in tackling poverty. The results also suggest that 
performing evaluation on the effectiveness of public spending and the implementation of 
social protection programs are necessary in order to ensure the public funds are being 
used efficiently that in ways that are consistent with the government’s strategic poverty 
reduction goals.  
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Table A.1 Variables used in the PMT in 2005 
	
No. Variable 
1 Floor area 
2 Floor type 
3 Wall type 
4 Toilet facility 
5 Drinking water source 
6 Source of lighting 
7 Fuel 
8 Frequency of buying beef/meat/milk in one week 
9 Frequency of eating in one day 
10 Frequency of buying new clothes in one year 
11 Ability to go to the doctor 
12 Sector of work of household head 
13 Highest education of household head 
14 Assets owned by the households 
 
Table A.2 Household characteristics in the PMT 2008 
No. Variable 
1 Type of place (1=Urban, 0=Others) 
2 Percapita floor 
3 Type of floor (1=Not earth, 0=Others) 
4 Type of wall (1=Brick/Cement, 0=Others) 
5 Toilet facility (1=Private, 0=Others) 
6 Drinking water source (1=Clean, 0=Other) 
7 Electricity (1=PLN, 0=Others) 
8 Type of roof (1=Concrete/Corrugated, 0=Others) 
9 Fuel for cooking (1=Not Firewood, 0=Other) 
10 Ownership of house (1=Private, 0=Others) 
11 Having micro credit 
12 Household size 
13 Household size square 
14 Age of the head of household 
15 Age of the head of household Square 
16 Head of household (1=male, 0=female) 
17 Head of household is married 
18 Head of household is male*married 
19 Working sector of household head is agriculture 
121	
	
20 Working sector of household head is industry 
21 Working sector of household head is service 
22 Working sector of household head is in formal sector 
23 Working sector of household head is in informal sector 
24 Education attaintment of household head is elementary school 
25 Education attaintment of household head is junior high school 
26 Education attaintment of household head is senior high school or higher 
27 Number of children 0-4 
28 Number of children in elementary school 
29 Number of children in junior high school 
30 Number of children in senior high school 
31 Maximum education attaintment within household is elementary school 
32 Maximum education attaintment within household is junior high school 
33 Maximum education attaintment within household is senior high school or higher
34 Dependency ratio 
35 Affordable to have health care if sick 
36 Have saving 
37 Have valuable goods 
38 Have land agriculture 
39 Have motocycle 
 
Table A.3 Village characteristics in the PMT 2008 
No. Variable 
1 Population density 
2 Distance to district 
3 Existing of elementary school (1=exist, 0=not exist) 
4 Existing of junior high school (1=exist, 0=not exist) 
5 Existing of community health care center (1=exist, 0=not exist) 
6 Existing of Polindes (1=exist, 0=not exist) 
7 Existing of Posyandu (1=exist, 0=not exist) 
8 Avaibility of doctor (1=available, 0=not available) 
9 Avaibility of midwife (1=available, 0=not available) 
10 Road type (1=asphalt, 0=others) 
11 Existing of semi permanen market place (1=exist, 0=not exist) 
12 Existing of credit facility (1=exist, 0=not exist) 
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Table A.4 Net enrolment rates using lag (1) of public spending  – OLS, FE, IV																																																																																																																		 
OLS Fixed effect IV 
Poor Non-poor Poor Non-poor Poor Non-poor 
Ln (real GRDP per capita) 0.0378*** 0.0256*** 0.00151 0.00903 -0.00984 -0.0114 
(0.00601) (0.00526) (0.0158) (0.0105) (0.0181) (0.00921) 
Lagged (1) Ln (district's education spending per school-
aged child) 
0.0119** 0.00994*** 0.00218 0.00134 -0.0167 0.0327** 
(0.00513) (0.00342) (0.005) (0.00279) (0.0272) (0.0138) 
Share of urban population -0.105*** -0.00673 -0.0446 0.022 -0.125* 0.0266 
(0.0237) (0.0173) (0.0683) (0.0373) (0.0736) (0.0375) 
Share of poor population 0.432*** 0.196*** 0.164 -0.0685 0.139 -0.0718 
(0.0542) (0.0412) (0.113) (0.0856) (0.118) (0.0602) 
Share of female population -0.096 -0.292* -0.0446 -0.127 -0.209 -0.188 
(0.208) (0.169) (0.187) (0.122) (0.251) (0.128) 
Average age of population 0.0172*** 0.0209*** 0.00517 -0.00154 0.0110* 0.000949 
(0.00293) (0.0021) (0.00504) (0.00299) (0.00577) (0.00294) 
Average household size -0.00744 0.0122 0.00336 0.00974 0.0213 0.0145 
(0.0137) (0.0101) (0.0181) (0.0102) (0.0182) (0.00927) 
Share of school-aged children 1.053*** 0.948*** 0.412** 0.479*** 0.587** 0.386*** 
(0.203) (0.143) (0.2) (0.142) (0.249) (0.127) 
Average education attainment 0.113*** 0.0794*** 0.0679*** 0.0628*** 0.0733*** 0.0598*** 
(0.00648) (0.00506) (0.0113) (0.00717) (0.0131) (0.00666) 
Constant -1.744*** -1.224*** -0.347 -0.059 
(0.182) (0.139) (0.34) (0.211) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummies Yes 
Observations 2,452 2,452 2,452 2,452 1,857 1,857 
R-squared 0.46 0.64 0.66 0.84 
Number of district 401 401 353 353 
Notes: Clustered standard errors in bracket; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients for year dummy are not reported in the table. 
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Table A.5 Transition rates using lag (1) of public spending  – OLS, FE, IV																																																																																																																		 
OLS Fixed effect IV 
Poor Non-poor Poor Non-poor Poor Non-poor 
Ln (real GRDP per capita) 0.0131** 0.00658 -0.00587 0.00512 -0.00599 0.000954 
(0.00571) (0.00475) (0.0104) (0.00641) (0.0133) (0.00591) 
Lagged (1) Ln (district's education spending per school-
aged child) 
0.00949** 0.00576* 0.00068 0.000387 0.0173 0.0269*** 
(0.00424) (0.00325) (0.00393) (0.00171) (0.0199) (0.00887) 
Share of urban population 0.0122 0.106*** 0.0425 0.123*** 0.114** 0.137*** 
(0.022) (0.0159) (0.0463) (0.0228) (0.054) (0.024) 
Share of poor population 0.194*** 0.0712 0.120** 0.0128 0.170** 0.0134 
(0.053) (0.0455) (0.0576) (0.0382) (0.0868) (0.0386) 
Share of female population 0.403** 0.567*** 0.433*** 0.185** 0.577*** 0.296*** 
(0.192) (0.144) (0.15) (0.0739) (0.184) (0.0818) 
Average age of population 0.00681** 0.00142 0.00131 -0.0113*** 0.00241 -0.00986*** 
(0.0027) (0.0019) (0.00335) (0.00169) (0.00424) (0.00188) 
Average household size 0.0463*** 0.0520*** 0.00939 0.0150** 0.00272 0.0119** 
(0.0135) (0.0112) (0.0109) (0.00606) (0.0134) (0.00594) 
Share of school-aged children -0.0122 -0.136 -0.597*** -0.362*** -0.543*** -0.323*** 
(0.217) (0.152) (0.15) (0.0722) (0.183) (0.0813) 
Average education attainment 0.0862*** 0.0649*** 0.0670*** 0.0693*** 0.0554*** 0.0648*** 
(0.00678) (0.00505) (0.0103) (0.00447) (0.0096) (0.00427) 
-1.035*** -0.524*** -0.103 0.294** 
(0.178) (0.14) (0.218) (0.129) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummies Yes 
Observations 2,452 2,452 2,452 2,452 1,857 1,857 
R-squared 0.58 0.77 0.78 0.94 
Number of district 401 401 353 353 
Notes: Clustered standard errors in bracket; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients for year dummy are not reported in the table. 
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Table A.6 Net enrolment rates using lag (2) of public spending  – OLS, FE, IV																																																																																																																		 
OLS Fixed effect IV 
Poor Non-poor Poor Non-poor Poor Non-poor 
Ln (real GRDP per capita) 0.0389*** 0.0288*** -0.0177 -0.00103 -0.0185 -0.0102 
(0.00694) (0.00533) (0.016) (0.0114) (0.0216) (0.0106) 
Lagged (2) Ln (district's education spending per school-
aged child) 
0.0106* 0.00890** 0.000143 0.00204 -0.0347 0.0278* 
(0.00577) (0.00353) (0.00665) (0.00269) (0.0297) (0.0146) 
Share of urban population -0.106*** -0.00308 -0.0705 0.0257 -0.0682 0.0138 
(0.0256) (0.0176) (0.0743) (0.0363) (0.0822) (0.0403) 
Share of poor population 0.451*** 0.218*** 0.19 -0.0398 0.206 -0.033 
(0.0587) (0.0426) (0.125) (0.0734) (0.133) (0.065) 
Share of female population -0.0517 -0.308* -0.233 -0.250** -0.0235 0.0331 
(0.231) (0.172) (0.214) (0.119) (0.372) (0.182) 
Average age of population 0.0170*** 0.0206*** 0.0130** 0.00126 0.0142** 0.00155 
(0.00343) (0.00216) (0.00557) (0.00316) (0.00653) (0.0032) 
Average household size -0.00526 0.0154 0.0145 0.0219*** 0.0204 0.0194** 
(0.0148) (0.0101) (0.017) (0.00752) (0.0189) (0.00925) 
Share of school-aged children 0.989*** 0.844*** 0.807*** 0.383*** 1.083*** 0.353** 
(0.23) (0.15) (0.231) (0.145) (0.291) (0.143) 
Average education attainment 0.111*** 0.0758*** 0.0683*** 0.0540*** 0.0672*** 0.0479*** 
(0.00735) (0.00511) (0.0121) (0.00716) (0.0141) (0.00694) 
Constant -1.720*** -1.181*** -0.256 0.13 
(0.194) (0.137) (0.354) (0.237) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummies Yes 
Observations 2,110 2,110 2,110 2,110 1,592 1,592 
R-squared 0.45 0.63 0.68 0.84 
Number of district 383 383 334 334 
Notes: Clustered standard errors in bracket; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients for year dummy are not reported in the table. 
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Table A.7 Transition rates using lag (2) of public spending  – OLS, FE, IV																																																																																																																		 
OLS Fixed effect IV 
Poor Non-poor Poor Non-poor Poor Non-poor 
Ln (real GRDP per capita) 0.0158** 0.00905* -0.00401 0.00651 -0.00807 -0.00149 
(0.00627) (0.00503) (0.0131) (0.00881) (0.0158) (0.00661) 
Lagged (2) Ln (district's education spending per school-
aged child) 
0.0135*** 0.00780** 0.00453 0.00164 0.00654 0.0243*** 
(0.00453) (0.00345) (0.00463) (0.00195) (0.0218) (0.0091) 
Share of urban population 0.0164 0.0987*** 0.0503 0.119*** 0.045 0.106*** 
(0.0225) (0.0159) (0.054) (0.0223) (0.0602) (0.0251) 
Share of poor population 0.199*** 0.0782 0.195*** 0.009 0.299*** 0.0108 
(0.0555) (0.0476) (0.0732) (0.0492) (0.0971) (0.0406) 
Share of female population 0.297 0.562*** 0.518*** 0.268*** 0.613** 0.199* 
(0.194) (0.148) (0.177) (0.0785) (0.272) (0.114) 
Average age of population 0.00776*** 0.000931 0.0005 -0.0106*** 0.00164 -0.00727*** 
(0.0026) (0.00196) (0.00353) (0.00191) (0.00478) (0.002) 
Average household size 0.0448*** 0.0515*** -0.00871 0.0129** -0.00651 0.00724 
(0.0142) (0.0115) (0.0121) (0.00569) (0.0138) (0.00577) 
Share of school-aged children 0.0516 -0.136 -0.462** -0.328*** -0.357* -0.298*** 
(0.212) (0.154) (0.191) (0.0856) (0.213) (0.0891) 
Average education attainment 0.0841*** 0.0659*** 0.0659*** 0.0667*** 0.0654*** 0.0628*** 
(0.00699) (0.00509) (0.0114) (0.00466) (0.0104) (0.00433) 
Constant -1.083*** -0.560*** -0.17 0.239 
(0.177) (0.141) (0.286) (0.163) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummies Yes 
Observations 2,110 2,110 2,110 2,110 1,592 1,592 
R-squared 0.57 0.77 0.78 0.94 
Number of district 383 383 334 334 
Notes: Clustered standard errors in bracket; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients for year dummy are not reported in the table.
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Table A.8 Food groups used in the DDS measures 
 	
DDS 
1. Grains (rice, corn, wheat, rice flour, corn flour, etc.). 
2. Tubers (sweet potato / cassava, sweet potatoes / yams, potatoes, cassava, taro,  
sago, etc. 
3. Fish (fresh, preserved fish / salted, shrimp, etc.). 
4. Meat (beef/lamb/pork/ chickens, etc) 
5. Eggs and dairy products (eggs, fresh milk, condensed milk, milk powder, etc.) 
6. Vegetables (spinach, kale, cucumber, carrots, beans, chickpeas, onions, peppers,  
tomatoes, etc.) 
7. Nuts (Peanuts / green / soy / red / stump / cashews, tofu, tempeh, tauco, oncom, etc.) 
8. Fruits (oranges, mango, apple, durian, rambutan, bark, Duku, pineapple,  
watermelon, banana, papaya, etc.) 
9. Oils and fats (coconut oil / cooking oil, butter, etc.) 
10. Material drinks (sugar, brown sugar, tea, coffee, chocolate, syrup, etc.) 
11. Spices (salt, nutmeg, coriander, pepper, shrimp paste, soy sauce, MSG, etc.) 
12. Other consumption (crackers, chips, noodles, vermicelli, macaroni, etc.). 
13. Ready food and drinks (bread, biscuits, cakes, porridge, ice syrup, lemonade, gado-g
rice Rames, etc.) 
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Table A.9 Multinomial logit – base outcome: treatment 0 
Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3 
Dummy of  living in a house with 
proper roof 
0.254 0.469* 0.123 
(0.49) (0.28) (0.35) 
Dummy of  living in a house with 
proper floor 
-0.185 0.106 -0.398 
(0.36) (0.22) (0.3) 
Dummy of  having access to proper 
sanitation system (septic tank) 
-0.084 -0.309* -0.823** 
(0.37) (0.19) (0.33) 
Dummy of  having a private toilet -0.111 -0.005 -0.023 
(0.34) (0.19) (0.29) 
Dummy of  having access to clean 
water 
1.102** 0.099 -0.067 
(0.52) (0.21) (0.29) 
Dummy of  having access to 
electricity 
0.089 -0.301 -0.192 
(0.55) (0.31) (0.38) 
Dummy of  having main fuel for 
cooking is firewood 
-1.055*** -0.327* -0.732** 
(0.41) (0.18) (0.32) 
Dummy of  housing is own property -0.48 0.393** 0.394 
(0.33) (0.2) (0.3) 
Total number of asset -0.211** -0.057 -0.271*** 
(0.1) (0.04) (0.07) 
Dummy of  BLT recipient -0.137 0.113 0.422 
(0.41) (0.2) (0.38) 
Dummy of  Askeskin/Jamkesmas 
recipient 
0.692** 0.548*** 0.337 
(0.33) (0.19) (0.29) 
Dummy of  having a pregnant 
mother in the household 
0.708 0.226 0.810* 
(0.62) (0.39) (0.49) 
Dummy of  household head never 
attended school 
0.636 0.31 0.055 
(0.43) (0.22) (0.35) 
Dummy of  education attainment of 
household head  is primary school 
0.728* 0.499** 0.529* 
(0.4) (0.2) (0.3) 
Dummy of living in urban areas -0.095 -0.341 -0.486 
(0.42) (0.21) (0.33) 
Constant -1.819* 0.341 0.13 
(0.96) (0.49) (0.7) 
Notes: Robust standard errors in bracket; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A.10 Multinomial logit – base outcome: treatment 4 
 
Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3 
Dummy of  living in a house with 
proper roof 
0.125 0.388**  0.485*** 
(0.3) (0.18) (0.17) 
Dummy of  living in a house with 
proper floor 
-0.365**  -0.438*** -0.185*   
(0.19) (0.1) (0.1) 
Dummy of  having access to proper 
sanitation system (septic tank) 
-0.428**  -0.496*** -0.205**  
(0.22) (0.11) (0.1) 
Dummy of  having a private toilet 0.057 -0.281*** -0.082 
(0.19) (0.1) (0.1) 
Dummy of  having access to clean 
water 
-0.064 -0.356*** -0.239**  
(0.23) (0.13) (0.12) 
Dummy of  having access to 
electricity 
-0.459 -0.540*** -0.420**  
(0.29) (0.18) (0.17) 
Dummy of  having main fuel for 
cooking is firewood 
-0.324 -0.400*** -0.199**  
(0.22) (0.11) (0.1) 
Dummy of  housing is own 
property 
-0.079 0.403*** 0.469*** 
(0.22) (0.13) (0.12) 
Total number of asset -0.166*** -0.075**  0.029 
(0.06) (0.03) (0.03) 
Dummy of  BLT recipient 1.129**  0.553*** 0.363**  
(0.48) (0.17) (0.15) 
Dummy of  Askeskin/Jamkesmas 
recipient 
0.255 0.504*** 0.409*** 
(0.17) (0.09) (0.09) 
Dummy of  having a pregnant 
mother in the household 
-0.398 -0.048 -0.018 
(0.4) (0.19) (0.18) 
Dummy of  household head never 
attended school 
0.600**  0.524*** 0.392*** 
(0.24) (0.13) (0.12) 
Dummy of  education attainment of 
household head  is primary school 
0.265 0.407*** 0.311*** 
(0.23) (0.12) (0.11) 
Dummy of living in urban areas -0.032 -0.157 -0.112 
(0.21) (0.11) (0.1) 
Constant -1.339**  1.421*** 1.908*** 
(0.63) (0.31) (0.29) 
Notes: Robust standard errors in bracket; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Figure A.1 Estimated densities for non-Raskin recipients in period 1 
 
Figure A.2 Estimated densities for existing Raskin recipients in period 1 
 
 
	
	
	
